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ABSTRACT

Most of thejudges in America are elected. Yet the institutionof the
elected judiciary is in trouble, perhaps in crisis. The pressures of
campaigning,particularlyraising money, have produced an intensity of electioneering that many observers see as damaging to the
institution itself. In an extraordinary development, four justices of
the Supreme Court recently expressed concern over possible loss of
trust in state judicial systems. Yet mechanisms that states have put
in place to strike a balance between the accountability values of an
elected judiciaryand rule of law values of unbiasedadjudicationare
increasinglyinvalidated by the federal courts. This Article presents
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an argument against this transformationof the American judiciary.
It is aimed at conservatives, for they are the driving force in the
movement to make campaigns for judicial offices exactly like
campaignsfor other 'political"offices. I seek to establish, as a matter
of policy, that conservative principles argue for a presumption
against politicization. I review the judicial "parity" debate, and
conclude that conservatives have a tremendous stake in the health
and viability of state courts--and in perceptions of the quality of
those courts. Broader issues of federalism are at stake as well
-particularly the '"aboratory"value of state experimentation in
seeking the optimal balance between accountabilityand rule of law
values. With this policy perspective in place, the Article then
examines the Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, the major victory for the pro-politicization
position. I argue that White rests on flawed premises and should be
narrowly construed.
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INTRODUCTION

What follows is a polemic on the transformation of the American
judiciary. It is aimed at conservatives, for they are the driving force
in the movement to make campaigns for judicial offices exactly like
campaigns for other "political" offices. This Article seeks to establish, as a matter of policy, that conservative principles argue for
a presumption against politicization. With this policy perspective
in place, this Article then examines the law concerning elected
judges, focusing on the Supreme Court decision in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White,' the major victory for what is currently
viewed as the conservative position. This Article argues that White
rests on flawed premises and should be narrowly construed.
Most of the judges in America are elected. 2 Yet, the institution of
the elected judiciary is in trouble, perhaps in crisis.' The pressures
of campaigning, particularly raising money, have produced an
intensity of electioneering that many observers see as damaging to
the institution itself.4 It is true that states with elected judges have
had in place mechanisms to regulate judicial elections: what
candidates say and how they raise money, for example. These
mechanisms-based on the American Bar Association's Model Code
of Judicial Conduct (Canons) 5 -have increasingly been invalidated

1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. See Richard Briffault, JudicialCampaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 181 (2004) (noting that, "[b]y one count, 87% of the state and
local judges in the United States have to face the voters at some point" (footnote omitted)).
3. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at vi (2007), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf [hereinafter JAS
REPORT 2006] (this report was prepared by the Justice at Stake Campaign and two of its
partners, the Brennan Center for Justice and the National Institute on Money in State
Politics). See generally Roy A. Schotland, New Challengesto States'JudicialSelection, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1077 (2007). But see Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe:
JudicialElections, the FirstAmendment, and Judges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POLY REV.
301, 355-56 (2003).
4. See JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 29-31; Wendy R. Weiser, Regulating Judges'
PoliticalActivity After White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651, 651-52 (2005).
5. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2007), available at http://www.
abanet.orgjudicialethics/ABAMCJC-approved.pdf [hereinafter MCJC 2007].
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by the courts, however.' Obviously, governmental regulation of
political activities raises serious First Amendment problems,
particularly in the context of elections where, the Supreme Court
has said, the Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application.7
Although this development predates it,' the Supreme Court
decision in White gave enormous momentum to the attack on the
Canons and the state rules derived from them.9 The Court, by a
majority of five to four, struck down the Minnesota Code of Judicial
Conduct's Announce Clause, which stated that a judicial candidate
shall not "announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues."'" Since White, the Canons have been under siege. A familiar
pattern has emerged. The challenges are brought by conservative
candidates and groups, often represented by prominent conservative
lawyer James Bopp." The state judicial establishment, bar associations, and reformers line up on the other side, either as parties or
amici. The battles bear a close resemblance to those fought over
campaign finance reform. Indeed, the issues coalesce, with conservatives rallying under the First Amendment banner in tones that
evoke the strong dissents of Justices Scalia and Thomas in campaign finance cases.' 2 The challengers have argued, in essence, that
6. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 768; Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1232-34
(11th Cir. 2007); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748-49, 766 (8th Cir.
2005); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320-25 (11th Cir. 2002); Ind. Right to Life v.
Shepard, 463 F. Supp. 2d 879, 881 (N.D. Ind. 2006); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F.
Supp. 2d 1021, 1024-25, 1044-45 (D.N.D. 2005); Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline &
Disability Comm'n, 130 S.W.3d 524, 535-38 (Ark. 2003).
7. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-54 (1982).
8. See, e.g., In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 42-45 (Mich. 2000).
9. Weiser, supra note 4, at 651 ("Since White, state regulatory systems designed to
promote the independence and impartiality of their judiciaries have been thrown into
disarray. By articulating a robust conception of First Amendment protections in the context
of judicial elections, the White decision has left the canons-many of which touch on matters
within the scope of the First Amendment-susceptible to attack.").
10. White, 536 U.S. at 768 (citing MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2000)).
11. Id. at 766. Mr. Bopp successfully represented the petitioners in White. Other plaintiffs
have included right-to-life groups, groups concerned with promoting family values, and
various Republican organizations.
12. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 247-48 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-12 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). It should be noted that Justice Scalia is the author of the White opinion, which
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states cannot have it both ways. If states choose to "tap the energy
and the legitimizing power of the democratic process,"'" they must
accord judicial candidates the full panoply of the First Amendment
protections that would apply to all other elections. As Justice
Kennedy put it, "[t]he state cannot opt for an elected judiciary and
then assert that its democracy, in order to work as desired, compels
the abridgement of speech."' 4 For the challengers, defenders of the
Canons are trying to prevent the politicization of politics, like King
Canute trying to hold back the sea.
5
This Article presents an alternative conservative position. The
policy arguments are based in federalism, certainly a bedrock
conservative doctrine. The starting premise is that conservatives
have a substantial stake in the health and vitality of the state
courts. Doctrines of judicial federalism are central to concepts of
federalism in general, and those doctrines rest on the notion of
parity-particularly the view that state courts are equally as
capable as the "independent" federal judiciary of providing fair trials
and protecting individual rights.'6 State courts play a fundamental
role in the American constitutional order. If the election of state
judges has somehow reached a point that threatens the capability
of state courts, the entire conceptual framework of judicial federalism is placed in doubt.
Two other aspects of federalism are invoked. The first is the
importance of the states' ability to structure their institutions. As
Justice O'Connor stated, "[t]hrough the structure of its government,
was joined by Justice Thomas.
13. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Gerry, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
14. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. My definition of conservative is somewhat general, of the "big-tent" variety. Within
the legal context, I refer to those who generally agree with judges such as Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas and, for example, support federalism and take a hard line on criminal justice
issues. As a general matter, one might make a loose red-state/blue-state division. For a
discussion of the problem of defining "judicial conservative," see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
"Conservative"Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429,
446-52 (2002). Support for White is not limited to conservatives. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial CandidatesAre Unconstitutional,35 IND. L. REV. 735,
735 (2002).
16. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federaland
State Courts:An EmpiricalAnalysis of JudicialParity,10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 250-52
(1983).
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and the character of those who exercise government authority, a
state defines itself as sovereign. ' ' 7 There is little dispute, at least so
far, that states can choose to have elected judges. 8 Yet both the
majority and dissenting opinions in White clearly view those with
whom they disagree as seeking to undermine the institution."9
The second federalism question is how far the states can experiment in the manner of selection. Judicial selection, with its complex
issues of law and policy, is an ideal area for states to fulfill their
laboratory role. How to reconcile the elected judiciary, and the
values of accountability, with rule of law values, particularly the
need to afford litigants due process, is one of the fundamental
questions facing the American legal system. Pre-White, state
regulation of judicial elections permitted different approaches to
calibrating the values. After White, the road seems open for the
challengers to achieve a single, nationwide model: a politicized
judiciary that is, essentially, another political branch. Beyond both
federalism points is the importance of public perception of the state
judiciaries as viable entities. Perception and symbolism play
important roles in federalism debates, particularly in the recurring
question of whether states are inferior entities or co-equal sovereigns with the national government."
Law trumps policy, of course, assuming for purposes of argument
that the distinction is clean cut. White represents "the law," but the
decision is seriously flawed as well as sharply divided. The majority
virtually ignored fundamental precepts of separation of powers in
treating the judiciary as a political branch because it (sometimes)
makes policy."' The dissenters did not have an easy time either,

17. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
18. See White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In resolving this case, however,
we should refrain from criticism of the State's choice to use open elections to select those
persons most likely to achieve judicial excellence. States are free to choose this mechanism
rather than, say, appointment and confirmation."). Justice O'Connor, however, expressed her
.concerns about judicial elections generally." Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19. For example, the majority accused Justice Ginsburg of "undermining" judicial elections. Id. at 782 (majority opinion).
20. See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
21. See White, 536 U.S. at 784 (rejecting "complete separation of the judiciary from the
enterprise of 'representative government').
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relying on the troubling distinction between political and nonpolitical elections.22
The questions raised by the politicization debate are not easy
ones. Indeed, the debate would benefit if participants recognized
just how hard these questions are. They include the following: (1)
Can states "square the circle": Can they choose an elected judiciary
while conducting the elections in a manner that makes it look like
an appointed one?; (2) Should White be broadly read, to the point of
invalidating all Canon-based regulation of judicial elections?; (3)
Can there be a distinction between political and nonpolitical
elections, or does the First Amendment apply with equal force in all
contexts? In other words, can differences in the offices to be chosen
lead to different degrees of regulation?; (4) If the answer is potentially yes, just how different is the judicial function from that of
legislation? Is it minimal in that they both make policy, or great in
that adjudication/application of law is fundamentally different from
legislative making of law? What about the fact that legislators have
constituencies, while judges, in theory, do not?; (5) Of what relevance is the contention that choosing an adjudicator is a political
act, but the process of adjudication is not? Can it be said that judges
derive their legitimacy from the office itself, not from their mode of
selection?; (6) In our constitutional system, what, if any, are the
limits of popular control of the judiciary through the electoral
process? Is a point reached at which the due process rights of
litigants or the ability of courts to protect minorities are threatened?; and (7) Does the practice of accepting campaign contributions
from potential parties also threaten due process? How can a
campaign be run without money, assuming no public financing?
What follows can best be viewed as a concept paper.2 3 The
Article's focus is not on whether a particular regulation is valid, but
rather on whether any regulation is valid. The main target audience
is legal conservatives, particularly those who view post-White
developments as a long overdue removal of impediments to democ22. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. A good model of such a paper, coming at related issues from a different perspective,
is Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996). Professor Smith's essay "challenges the basic
assumptions of campaign finance reform advocates, rather than the mechanics or structure
of regulation." Id. at 1049-50.
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racy in the area of judicial selection. This Article argues that the
conservative position should be far more nuanced, based on a sense
of the constitutional role of state courts, as well as the constitutional
rights of state court candidates. There is always a risk in attempting
to juxtapose structural, seemingly abstract values, such as federalism and separation of powers, with the concrete rights of those who,
for example, wish to campaign. But there is another group of rights
holders very much in the picture: those who must appear before
those candidates once they become judges, and whose personal
rights to due process must also be considered. Perhaps this debate
is an example of the scenario envisaged by Justice Breyer in an
important campaign finance opinion, one where important constitutional interests lie on both sides of the equation.2 4 In any event, the
Article is written at a high level of generality in hopes of moving the
debate toward some agreement on the range of interests at stake.
Part I of the Article focuses on the current "problems" created by
state judicial elections and asks whether they are in fact problems
or the normal play of the democratic process. Special attention is
paid to campaign contributions and to public opinion surveys that
identify these contributions as fostering a negative perception of the
state courts. Part II makes the case for conservative concern about
the health of state courts and about the bearing of federalism
arguments on state judicial elections. This section posits the
presumption against politicization. Part III develops possible
conservative rebuttals to the presumption-both in the domain of
law and of policy. This section also presents an analysis and critique
of White. Part IV examines what the post-White world of judicial
elections might look like. It considers alternative scenarios, and
recommends one that contains some degree of regulation as well as
a second generation of judicial campaign measures.

24. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-401 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
Ginsburg cited this scenario in her White dissent. See White, 536 U.S. at 813 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY-IS IT
REAL? IS IT A PROBLEM?

We may well be witnessing a transformation of the American
judiciary, at least in the thirty-nine states that use some form of
election to choose at least some of their judges.25 Whether this sea
change is a problem is the subject of intense debate, but there is no
disagreement that it is happening. Judicial elections are becoming
increasingly like elections to legislative and executive offices. As one
critical observer put it:
[D]isturbing trends documented in recent years include a
staggering escalation of the amount of money used to support
judicial campaigns, a growth in the participation of political
parties and other interest groups in judicial campaigns, increases in the amount of television advertising, [and] a deterioration of the tone of campaigns ......
In other words, we are witnessing the "politicization"2 of judicial
campaigns. The goal of this Part is to examine and elaborate on the
phenomenon as a prelude to the argument that conservatives should
be troubled by it.
A. Politicization-TheNew JudicialCampaigns
Consider three aspects of the trend. The first is the tendency of
candidates to run touting advertisements emphasizing not only
their qualifications but also their positions. Examples include ads
such as '"Maximum Marion' Bloss. You do the crime, you do the
time,"" or declarations that a candidate is pro-life and for "tradi-

25. For a useful description of judicial selection methods, see Schotland, supra note 3, at
1084-88 & app. 1.
26. Weiser, supra note 4, at 654 (footnotes omitted).
27. Id.
28. See Schotland, supra note 3, at 1098. The phenomenon predates White, but seems
almost certain to intensify.

20081

POLITICAL JUDGES AND POPULAR JUSTICE

1553

tional marriage,"" or that she is the only candidate who has put
"thousands of criminals behind bars. 30
A second, often remarked, phenomenon is the rise of negative ads,
many paid for by independent, or "special interest," groups.3 1
According to one study, negative ads accounted for one-fifth of all
ads in 2004, twice the rate of the previous election cycle. 2 The
recent Republican primary in the Alabama race for chief justice
featured remarkable negative advertising from both candidates. The
following is a description of exchanges between challenger Tom
Parker and sitting Chief Justice Drayton Nabers:
One spat occurred in April of 2006, when the late Supreme
Court Justice Hugo Black was inducted into the Alabama
Lawyers Hall of Fame. Parker used the event to lambaste
Nabers, a former law clerk of Black's. He distributed a diatribe
at the ceremony, which stated that "[Black's induction was] a
shameful disgrace to the people of Alabama," and that Black
"personally launched the war to kick God out of the public
square in America." In an attempt to solidify his conservative
credentials, Nabers released a television advertisement in which
he stated that he is conservative, pro-life, and will always
support traditional marriage. Parker responded with an ad of
his own, questioning Nabers' stances on the aforementioned
issues, and calling Nabers "too liberal, too wrong for Alabama."
In another ad, Parker targeted the issue of gay marriage. While
spooky music is played, the viewer is informed that a "liberal
judge" in Georgia had recently thrown out the state's same-sex
marriage ban. An image of two homosexual men dressed in
tuxedos appeared on the screen as the announcer asks, "Is
Alabama next?" He answers the question, "Maybe! Chief Justice
Drayton Nabers and a liberal state court majority say they will
back all federal court orders-even one ordering Alabama to
recognize gay marriages!" In another ad, Parker takes aim on a
29. Amanda Bronstad, Cash Is Flowing in JudicialElections, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 2006, at
1,9.
30. Daniel P. Elliott, The Politicization of the Judiciary 22 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
31. JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 8; Weiser, supra note 4, at 654.
32. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW PoLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 1, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPolitics
Report2004.pdf [hereinafter JAS REPORT 2004].
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court decision which took a convicted rapist and murderer off
death row. Once again, music worthy of a horror film is played,
and a black-and-white image of a hand holding a knife is
displayed on the screen. Then, a less-than-flattering image of
Nabers appears next to a French flag, then a Mexican flag and
a United Nations flag, and the viewer is informed that Nabers
and the Alabama Supreme Court used foreign law to overturn
the death sentence of this convicted murderer.3 3
The aspect of politicization that has received the most attention
from academics and other observers is the dramatic increase in the
amount of money spent on judicial elections.34 Writing in 1985,
Professor Schotland stated, "[W]e have the spectacle of judges
during campaign season receiving not just checks but even cash at
public gatherings and we have an increasing spate of news articles
about funding and judicial campaigns."35 The trend continues. As
the NationalLaw Journalput it: "Running for state judge has never
been pricier."36 Statistics abound. According to the New York Times,
"Spending ...
is skyrocketing, with some judges raising $2 million or

more for a single campaign."3 In 2006, the most expensive judicial
race in the country was the aforementioned election of Alabama's
chief justice. The three candidates raised $8.2 million.3" The most
expensive race, however, remains that for a seat in the Illinois
Supreme Court in 2004. The two candidates spent $9.3 million.39
An extremely helpful source of information on money in judicial
elections is the periodic reports by the Justice at Stake Campaign
(JAS), a Washington-based reform group. 40 Given the group's reform
orientation, one may question its ultimate conclusions about the
33. Elliott, supra note 30, at 21.
34. Bronstad, supranote 29, at 1.
35. Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' CampaignFinancing:Are State Judges'Robes the
Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 57, 90 (1985).
36. Bronstad, supranote 29, at 1.
37. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, CampaignCash Mirrorsa High Court's Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at Al.
38. JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 15; see also Patrick Marley, Ziegler Wins Court
Seat, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 2007, available at http://www.jsonline.com/story/
index.aspx?id=586679 (noting that the 2007 Wisconsin Supreme Court race was the most
expensive in state history).
39. JAS REPORT 2004, supra note 32, at vi.
40. Id. at vii; JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at vi.

20081

POLITICAL JUDGES AND POPULAR JUSTICE

1555

current state of judicial campaigns, but its compilation of data is
indispensable for those studying the issue. Here are two excerpts
from the 2004 study:
More Fundraisingin More States. In 2003-2004, candidates
combined to raise over $46.8 million. In the past three cycles,
candidates have raised $123 million, compared to $73.5 million
in the three cycles prior. Nine states broke candidate fundraising records in the 2003-2004 cycle.
Average Cost of Winning Jumps 45 Percent in Two Years. In
2004, the average amount raised by winners in the 43 races in
which candidates raised any money leapt to $651,586, from
$450,689 in 2002. Average fundraising among all candidates
who raised money climbed to $434,289.4"
The 2006 JAS Report sounded many of the same themes,
referring to 2006 as "the most threatening year yet to the fairness
of America's state courts. 4 2 JAS noted increased spending, including the fact that "[o]f the 10 states that had entirely privately
financed contested Supreme Court campaigns in 2006, five ... set
state records for candidate fundraising in a single court race, as well
as records for total fundraising by all high court candidates. 4 3
The Report also expressed concern over vitriolic negative
advertisements" and the spread of politicization to intermediate
and trial courts. 4' The JAS findings were not all negative, however.
Indeed, the Report suggested the potential for self-correction within
the system: "[I]n 2006, judicial candidates who sought to put
disputed political and legal issues at the center of their candidacy
lost more often than they won. In state after state, the more that
judicial campaigns sounded like politics as usual, the warier the
voters seemed. 4 6
March 2007 marked a further escalation of the politicization of
judicial campaigns. A newly formed group-The Democratic Judicial
41. JAS REPORT 2004, supra note 32, at vii.
42. JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at vi.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id. at 8-9.
45. Id. at 24 (noting that "(a]fter all, the vast majority of civil cases are resolved by trial
and intermediate courts, not state Supreme Courts").
46. Id. at 35.
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Campaign Committee (DJCC)--entered the fray with a resounding
broadside. 47 Declaring itself "the only organization whose primary
mission is to elect Democratic judges to state courts, 48 the DJCC
declared:
In the early 1990s, large corporate interests began buying
control of many of our state Supreme Courts and many of our
lower courts. Orchestrated by a political consultant named Karl
Rove, these campaigns began in Texas and Alabama, spending
millions of dollars. Today, in states with contested, partisan
elections, Republicans control 30 of 37 seats on our Supreme
Courts. In states with "non-partisan" elections, Republican
interest groups have put an additional 30 justices on the
bench.... The DJCC is working together to pull together a
national donor network to help elect qualified, intellectually
honest judges to our state courts.49
The DJCC described the Republican-backed judges in the
following terms:
While there certainly are honest Republican justices, they are
becoming a rare breed as corporate interests are focused on
taking over our judicial system. Millions of dollars from insurance, oil and drug corporations are being spent to install judges
who are bought and paid for by big business. As long as these
judges remain on the bench, consumers' and workers' rights,
environmental protections, and the opportunity for individual
citizens to find justice in our court system will continue to
disappear. °
It is too early to tell how much the emergence of such a group is a
step towards treating state court races as part of the national
political picture-perhaps on par with tallies of how many governorships have gone to which parties. The DJCC is quick to point out
47. See Democratic Judicial Campaign Committee-About, http://djcc.orglabout/index.

html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter DJCC]. DJCC material is summarized in Are
Democrats About To Up the Ante in the JudicialElection Wars?, EYES ON JUSTICE, Mar. 22,
2007, availableat http://justiceatstake.org/JASnews/22MarchO7.htm.
48. DJCC, supranote 47.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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that national conservative interest groups are already active
players.5 1 It seems fair, however, to characterize the development as
an escalation of the rhetoric surrounding judicial campaigns.
In sum, the politicization of judicial elections shows every sign of
increasing to the point where the elections, and perhaps the
judiciary itself, are transformed. As Professor James Gibson has
asserted:
The confluence of broadened freedom for judges to speak out on
issues, the increasing importance of state judicial policies, and
the infusion of money into judicial campaigns have produced
what may be described as the "Perfect Storm" of judicial
elections. This storm is radically reshaping the atmosphere of
state judicial elections, as it gathers strength and spreads
throughout the nation. 2
This situation is a marked contrast to the phenomenon, which
prevailed until recently, of low-visibility, 'low-salience" elections."
Part of the explanation is no doubt the spread to the judicial arena
of practices found in every other type of American election. In the
judicial context, however, there is an additional explanation: the
removal of barriers erected to prevent this very phenomenon.
B. The Fall of the Canons and the Rise of the Challengers
The American Bar Association has, over the years, promulgated
codes regulating judicial conduct,5 4 including conduct in elections.55
States gradually adopted most or all of the ABA's Canons of Judicial
Ethics (the Canons) to the point that they became the dominant
source of governance of judicial elections. The Canons cover such
matters as forbidding making "commitments," "pledges," or "promises" about a candidate's views,5 6 as well as financial aspects of a
51. Id.
52. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartialityof State Supreme Courts:Legitimacy
Theory and "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SCI.REv. 59, 61 (2008).
53. See Briffault, supranote 2, at 205.
54. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mcjc/toc.html.
55. MCJC 2007, supranote 5. The current Canons reflect an effort to adapt to White.
56. Id. R. 4.1(A)(13).
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campaign, including a prohibition on direct solicitation of funds by
candidates." Obviously the Canons-or more precisely the state
rules adopting them in a binding fashion, generally by state high
courts-operated to prevent the politicization described here. That
was their goal.5" At the same time, however, they had a direct,
negative effect on candidate speech, thus raising serious First
Amendment questions.
Even before the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Republican
Partyof Minnesota v. White,5" successful challenges were mounted.6"
White, discussed in more detail in Part III,61 relied on the First
Amendment to strike down a Minnesota rule forbidding a judicial
candidate to "announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. 62 The majority left the question open,6" but suggested
that "judicial and legislative elections"6 4 might be governed by the
same constitutional rules.6 5 White was clearly seen by many
potential challengers of the Canons to have precisely that effect.
Their challenges have often succeeded, particularly in federal
courts.66

The challenge to the Canons has a distinctly conservative flair.
Justice Scalia wrote the Court's opinion in White, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and
O'Connor.67 The latter two justices also wrote concurring opinions,
while joining in the Court's opinion.68 Justices Stevens and
57. Id. R. 4.1(A)(8).
58. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 651 ("[State rules governing campaigns for judicial office]
have long served as one of the primary means by which states seek to ensure the distinct
characters and constitutional roles of their judicial branches.").
59. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
60. See, e.g., In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000).
61. See discussion infra Part III.C.
62. White, 536 U.S. at 770 (citing MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2002)) (internal quotation omitted).
63. Id. at 783 ("[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires
campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office.").
64. Id. at 784.
65. See id.
66. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 693 ("State courts ... have been much more sensitive to
separation of powers concerns."). But see Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (lifting injunction against enforcement of pledges or promises and commit
Canons).
67. White, 536 U.S. at 766.
68. Id.
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Ginsburg each wrote a dissent, joined by the other members of the
Court's 'liberal" wing.6 9 The challengers themselves are primarily
conservative candidates and groups7 ° whose complaints stress a
desire to inject conservative views and subjects into judicial
elections. 7 As developed in Part III, the challengers' motives include
the concern that these views may be excluded under the Canons and
the conviction that greater popular exposure to where candidates
stand will move the law in a conservative direction.7 2 What has
developed then is a debate between two groups that this Article will
call the ABA establishment reformers (Reformers) on the one hand,
and the First Amendment absolutist challengers (Challengers) on
the other.7 3 In order to develop the thesis on how conservatives
ought to view the issue, it is necessary to briefly examine the debate
and some underlying assumptions.
C. Is PoliticizationBad?
The position of the Reformers rests on a central premise: the
manner in which judicial campaigns are conducted affects the
subsequent operation and perception of the judiciary. As a general
matter, it is easy to characterize the Reformers as mired in a nineteenth century conception of the law as a gentleman's profession,
and the operation of the judiciary as all that is good and noble in
that conception. As a result, they want judicial elections-which
they regard as a necessary evil, at best-to reflect that image. It
appears that their main point is that for the judiciary to perform
properly, it must be kept separate from the hurly-burly, rough-andtumble world of politics. The ideal figure of the judge is a neutral,

69. Id.
70. Amici on the challengers' behalf in the White remand included Republican Seniors,
Minnesota College Republicans, and Indian Asian American Republicans of Minnesota. See
Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 456 F.3d
912 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 99-4021), 2002 WL 32102161.
71. The litigation in White was triggered by a Republican judicial candidate's desire to
criticize the Minnesota Supreme Court "on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion."
White, 536 U.S. at 768.
72. See discussion infra Part III.
73. I realize that there is a temporal anomaly in that the Reformers have already achieved
their goals and represent the existing establishment. The Challengers might consider
themselves to be the true reformers.
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somewhat distant individual.7 4 From this perception there flows a
more general concept of judging: judges apply the law in a neutral
fashion. When they do make law, their actions are subject to
constraints such as formalized adversarial presentation and
precedent; they are not legislators.7 5
The Canons dealing with elections reflect two primary concerns.
The first, exemplified by the prohibitions on pledges and promises,7"
is that judges should strive to avoid committing themselves in
advance to particular results. There is a double danger: injustice
and the appearance of injustice. A second concern, exemplified by
the prohibition on direct solicitation,7 7 isthat money will taint the
judicial process. Judges may favor, or appear to favor, those who
have helped put them on the bench.78
In evaluating these concerns and the support they provide for the
Reformers, one must ask whether they flow from informed common
sense or whether there is actual evidence that the practices the
Reformers decry do hurt the judicial process and/or the perception
thereof. In the case of campaign contributions, there is substantial
evidence that a problem exists. Professor Gibson reports the results
of a recent empirical study as follows: "[T]he strongest effects on
institutional legitimacy come from campaign contributions. When
groups with direct connections to the decision maker give contributions, legitimacy suffers substantially. ''79 Numerous public opinion
polls reach similar conclusions. For example, a Marist Institute poll
conducted in New York in 2003 concluded that "[e]ighty-three
74. Judge Carl McGowan referred to "the adversary trial carried on in the sanitized and
insulated atmosphere of the courthouse." Carl McGowan, Regulatory Analysis and Judicial
Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 627, 637 (1981). He stated that "[a]nyone with experience of both
knows that a courtroom differs markedly in style and tone from a legislative chamber." Id.
75. See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 487 & n.1 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
76. MCJC 2007, supra note 5, at R. 4.1(A)(13).
77. Id. R. 4.1(A)(8).
78. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 225 ("Surely, solicitation-the act of asking for a
contribution-raises the same dangers of undue influence and the appearance of impropriety
as the contribution itself. Indeed, personal solicitation highlights the dangers of abuse by
focusing on the potentially coercive nature of the request for contributions aimed at a
potential donor who has or is likely to have business before the judge seeking the contribution.
Personal solicitation, thus, particularly threatens the appearance of impropriety and
undermines the appearance of evenhanded treatment essential to the judicial role.").
79. Gibson, supra note 52, at 69.
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percent of registered voters in the state indicate that having to raise
money for election campaigns has at least some influence on the
decisions made by judges." A 1999 national poll for the National
Center for State Courts found that "[s]lightly over 75% of the
respondents agreed that having to raise campaign funds influences
elected judges."'" In a Pennsylvania survey, the figures reached 95
percent.8 2 Perhaps most disturbing is a recent New York Times
analysis of campaign contributions and the Ohio Supreme Court. 83
It suggests empirical support for the intuitive conclusion in the
surveys-Ohio justices voted in favor of contributors "70 percent of
the time. '
But is there a problem? The same surveys show a relatively high
overall degree of confidence in the courts.8 5 The doubts raised by
campaign finance practices are likely to increase-especially given
clear evidence that more money is being spent on judicial campaigns.86 Any connection, however, between campaign pronouncements and justice or the appearance thereof may be harder to prove.
Professor Gibson reports, "Perhaps the single most important
finding of this articleis that candidatesfor judicialoffice can engage
in policy debates with their opponents without undermining the
legitimacy of courts and judges."8' The Challengers would rush to
say that this proves their point: that judicial electioneering is just
as normal and healthy as electioneering in any other context.
Moreover, there is substantial
evidence of public support for
88
retaining the elected judiciary.
80. COMM'N To PROMOTE PUB. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, FINAL REPORT TO THE

CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF N.Y. app. C, at iv (2006), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/
JudicialElectionsReport Appendices.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. REPORT 2006].
81. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS 42 (1999),

available at http://ppc.unl.edu/publications/documents/howpublic-viewsthestatecourts.
pdf.
82. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 774-75 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gibson,
J., dissenting).
83. See Liptak & Roberts, supra note 37.
84. Id.
85. N.Y. REPORT 2006, supranote 80, app. E, at 4; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
supranote 81, at 2.
86. See generally JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3; JAS REPORT 2004, supra note 32.
87. Gibson, supra note 52, at 72 (emphasis added).
88. Nat Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38
SETON HALLL. REv. 63,68 (2008) (discussing states' attempts to deter campaign abuses, faced
with "the reality that 'people want to elect judges"' (quoting Jan Witold Baran, Judicial
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Perhaps the sky has not fallen, at least not yet. 9 Things can
change, however.9" Indeed, Professor Gibson concludes his study
-the focus of which is on the institutional legitimacy of state
courts-with the following warning: "Those concerned about threats
to the legitimacy of elected state courts would do well to turn their
attention away from substantive policy pronouncements and focus
instead on the corrosive effects of politicized campaigning...."91
Drawing the line between "substantive policy pronouncements" and
"politicized campaigning," however, is not always easy. Dissenting
in White, Justice Ginsburg raised due process concerns in noting the
"grave danger to litigants from judicial campaign promises."92 She
also expressed broader concerns about politicized judicial campaigns: 'The perception of that unseemly quid pro quo-a judicial
candidate's promises on issues in return for the electorate's votes at
the polls-inevitably diminishes the public's faith in the ability of
judges to administer the law without regard to personal or political
self-interest."9 3 Whether one calls it "electioneering," "politicization,"
or something else, there is a real risk that the kind of campaigning
for judicial seats that one sees today will only go in one direction-towards a similarity of campaigns for all offices that will
obscure what makes the judiciary different. This Article accepts the
Reformers' premise that the nature of campaigns can affect the
operation of the institution and the way it is perceived.
Indeed, one of the fundamental questions in the whole debate is
whether it is only about regulating elections, not about regulating
the judiciary. Was the Eighth Circuit right when it said, in upholding a challenge to two Minnesota Canons, "[t]his case ...
is not about
what happens after an election"?9 4 Perhaps there is an oversimplifiCandidateSpeech After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, CT. REV., Spring 2002, at 12,
12)).
89. Dimino, supra note 3, at 355-56.
90. See generally Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal ConstitutionalLitigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605 (1981).
91. Gibson, supra note 52, at 72.
92. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 817 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 818.
94. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 752 (8th Cir. 2005). The circuit
court made this statement in its decision on remand from the Supreme Court. The decision
on remand struck down Canons concerning partisan activity and solicitation of funds. The
Supreme Court did not rule on the validity of these Canons.
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cation in the Challengers' apparent assumption that "anything goes"
is good. This need not mean automatic acceptance of the Reformers'
solutions.9 5 Rather, this Article's point is that current developments are cause for concern, at least as much for conservatives as for
any other group. Conservatives need to take a hard look at the
developing situation in the state courts and ask if it is a salutary
development. This is because there are grounds to justify worrying
about the health of those courts, and the health of the state courts
is central to conservative visions of judicial federalism. Moreover,
every time a court strikes down a state regulation of judicial
campaigns, it strikes at the heart of the state's ability to "define[]
itself as a sovereign"9 6 and its efforts to find the elusive balance
between accountability (election of judges) and the rule of law (fair
adjudication). The First Amendment is not the only constitutional
value in play. Indeed, important structural concerns based in
federalism, coupled with the basic due process rights of individuals
to fair adjudication, suggest that the presumption-for conservatives as for others-should be in favor of efforts to prevent
politicization of the state courts.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE STATE COURTS-A PRESUMPTIVE
CONSERVATIVE POSITION AGAINST POLITICIZATION

This Article proceeds on the assumption that politicization at
least puts in question the viability of the state courts. Public
perception of them as places where all citizens can receive impartial
justice may falter. Extensive campaign promises and political debts
may lead to prejudgment. Campaign contributions, in particular,
may create a class of favored litigants. Suppose that both citizens in
general and close observers of the legal system lose confidence in
the state courts. Why would such a situation be of particular
concern to conservatives?

95. Indeed, those who relied on the Canons may not have been fully aware of the First
Amendment broadside that was sure to come.
96. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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A. JudicialFederalism-TheParityDebate"
A recurring theme in the doctrines governing federal jurisdiction
is that state courts are just as capable of vindicating federal rights
as federal courts.98 This premise of parity underlies decisions
concerning such subjects as abstention, 9 habeas corpus, °° and, to
some degree, the Eleventh Amendment.'0 ' Several points require
emphasis in the context of this Article. The first is that parity-based
doctrines are of great practical significance in the day-to-day
operation of the state courts. They prevent, or limit, federal court
interference with state court proceedings at both the initial and the
post-trial stages.0 2 These doctrines frequently raise the question of
whether state courts can police the officials of their own governments.'O3 They sometimes send litigants to state courts despite their
desire to be in a federal forum.'"
Equally important is a second aspect of these doctrines: their
symbolism. Perhaps the most famous statement of the symbolic element of parity-based doctrines is Justice Black's evocation of "Our
Federalism" in Younger v. Harris.0 5 The symbol is that of a co-equal
court system, just as one broader vision of federalism depicts the
federal and state governments generally as co-equal sovereigns.' 6
97. See generally Bator, supra note 90, at 623-29.
98. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 37 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that some
commentators "vehemently maintain that state courts are equal to federal courts in their
ability and willingness to protect constitutional rights") (footnote omitted).
99. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
100. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
101. See Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) ("While we can assume
there is a special role for Article III courts in the interpretation and application of federal law
in other instances as well, we do not for that reason conclude that state courts are a less than
adequate forum for resolving federal questions. A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy
of state forums would run counter to basic principles of federalism."); cf. Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 753-56 (1999) (noting the possibility of federal law-based suits against states in
state courts).
102. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1975).
103. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 21-22 (2d ed. 2003).
104. This is the case, for example, with Pullman abstention and much Eleventh
Amendment litigation. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)
(discussing the doctrine of abstention).
105. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
106. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 768-69 (2002). See
generallyGeorge D. Brown, Counterrevolution?-National
CriminalLaw After Raich, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 947, 976 (2005) (discussing the importance of symbolic dimensions of the new
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Indeed, the doctrines reflect a fundamental assumption underlying
the judicial system as a whole: State courts are equal partners with
federal courts in the enforcement of federal law generally. Narrow
rules concerning when, a case "arises under" federal law may
prevent cases presenting significant federal issues from being
brought in or removed to a federal court." 7 They are heard in state
courts, an allocation of authority that reflects, in part, a belief that
the two systems are of equal competence. In the realm of constitutional rights, Professor Paul Bator stressed the role of state courts
as protectors of those rights. He spoke of
[t]he importance of creating and maintaining conditions that
assure that, in the long run, the state courts will be respected
and equal partners with the lower federal courts in the enterprise of formulating and enforcing federal constitutional
principles .... We must never forget that under our constitutional
structure it is the state, and not the lower federal, courts that
constitute our ultimate guarantee that a usurping legislature
and executive cannot strip us of our constitutional rights.10 '
There is, of course, the competing vision, particularly with respect
to the enforcement of constitutional rights. As Professors Solimine
and Walker note, "[sjkeptics of parity ... argue that historical
considerations-notably, the outcome of the Civil War and the
passage of constitutional amendments during the Reconstruction
Era-have elevated the federal government in general, and federal
courts in particular, to a place of prominence over their state
counterparts."'1 9 As the quote suggests, the parity doctrines are
profoundly conservative in nature."0 They stand in direct opposition
to what Professor Bator referred to as the nationalist theme that
federal courts "are to be preferred" in the adjudication of federal
rights."' It is no surprise that there is an intense nationalist

federalism).
107. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 98, at 265-95 (discussing constitutional and
statutory tests for "arising under" determination).
108. Bator, supra note 90, at 627.
109. Solimine & Walker, supra note 16, at 223.
110. Cf. YACKLE, supra note 103, at 23-24.
111. Bator, supranote 90, at 607.
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critique of decisions like Younger." 2 Thus, for conservatives there is
a lot at stake, both practically and doctrinally, in the parity debate.
Arguments over judicial federalism mirror broader arguments
about federalism. They often discuss, for example, the equality of
state and national institutions versus the superiority of the latter.
Professor Bator gives a nice example of how the two levels of
federalism discourse blend. Invoking the classic federalism theme
of decentralization, he contends that state judges can enrich the
discourse over federal constitutional rights by bringing to it an
emphasis on structural and institutional values.'1 3 Their ability to
enrich the discourse, however, will be substantially diminished if
other participants in it view the state judges as political operatives.
The goal in this Part is not just to remind conservatives of the
importance of the parity debate, but to link it to today's debate over
the effect of politicization on the state judiciaries. The parity debate
has, more often than not, come out in a conservative direction." 4
Perhaps conservatives take this for granted. Yet, decisions like
Younger and its progeny".5 were often hard fought battles. They
represent one of the triumphs of American legal conservatism. Yet,
these decisions could be undermined, if not undone, if their major
premise-the viability and fairness of state courts-was widely seen
as discredited. This premise is crucial not only in the context of
specific decisions such as Younger, or even specific aspects of the
parity debate. It underlies the American judicial order, and the vital
role of state courts within that order. It is hard to believe that
conservatives would take a position that threatens this allocation of
authority.
The parity debate, as well as broader notions of judicial federalism, hinges on notions of the quality of state courts. These
perceptions are, in part, as Professor Bator said, "intuitive.""' In
individual cases, the decision about federal interference with state
adjudication often turns on whether the state system offers a "full

112. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 16, at 218.
113. Bator, supra note 90, at 631-34.
114. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
115. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 98, at 832-56 (discussing extension of
Younger).
116. Bator, supra note 90, at 629.
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and fair opportunity" for the presentation of federal claims.1 7 Of far
greater importance is the general perception held by federal courts
of how a state judicial system operates as a whole."' Dissenting in
Dombrowski v. Pfister,"' Justice Harlan criticized federal intervention in that case as resting upon "the unarticulated assumption that
state courts will not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate
constitutional rights promptly and effectively. Such an assumption
should not be indulged in the absence of a showing that such is apt
to be so in a given case."' 2 ° Justice Harlan's dissent prefigured the
emergence of generalized abstention doctrines in cases such as
Younger. Perhaps the most explicit statement of the importance of
general perceptions of state courts is found in Justice Powell's
k " '
opinion in Stone v. Powell:
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of
the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state
courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values
through fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The
principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective institutional settings within which
federal judges and state judges operate. Despite differences in
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to
federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past,
we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack
of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and
appellate courts of the several States.122

117. See id. at 625.
118. See id. (noting a potential generalized mistrust of state courts).
119. 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 499; see also Bator, supra note 90, at 625 ("We are talking, in the case of the
injunction action, about whether a state judge should be prohibited from adjudicating a
proceeding for the enforcement of state law and policy, not because there has been a showing
that federal defenses to the proceeding will not receive a full and fair hearing in the state
court, but, again because of a general mistrust of the competence and sensitivity of state
judges.").
121. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
122. Id. at 493 n.35.
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Thus, at the moment, parity prevails. As the quote from Stone
indicates, however, parity's position rests on current perceptions of
the state courts. Those perceptions could change. Professor Bator
stated the matter succinctly: "When mistrust of the state courts is
12
justified and endemic, federal supervision must be strengthened.""
For him, "[i]f we are fundamentally suspicious of the state court
system-if the central problem continues to be the problem of
mistrust-then the 'full and fair opportunity' formula will not do. 124
Although it arose in the context of federal court interference with
state administrative proceedings, Gibson v. Berryhill2 5 is instructive. In that case there were two different types of optometrists in
Alabama, but the board that regulated the profession was composed of only one group. 2 6 In the face of abstention arguments, the
Supreme Court upheld the propriety of a federal court challenge to
a pending disciplinary proceeding. 2 ' Although the case might be
viewed as a context-based example of the "full and fair opportunity"
doctrine, it is clear that the Court saw the board as structurally
incapable of rendering an unbiased judgment against a class of
parties. 2 '
Gibson could be an indication of far broader things to come in the
context of state judiciaries. What this Article has referred to here as
the politicization phenomenon could lead to generalized mistrust.
It is no coincidence that the most influential critique of the parity129
based doctrines, written thirty years ago by Professor Neuborne, i30
focuses on the election of state judges as a reason for mistrust.
Current developments could be seen as leading to an unfair judiciary with judges who have prejudged cases and favored litigants
based on campaign contributions. On a deeper level, mistrust can
123. Bator, supra note 90, at 635.
124. Id. at 627.
125. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
126. See id. at 578.
127. See id. at 580-81.
128. See id. at 579 ("It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial
pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes."). The Court
cited Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972), both of which are important cases on procedural due process within state courts. It is
significant that the Court stated that Ward "indicates that the financial stake need not be as
direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tuney." Gibson, 411 U.S. at 579.
129. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
130. See id. at 1127-28.
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stem from erosion of the ideal of the state courts as different from
the political branches. Recall that a central goal of the Challengers
is to have all elections treated alike, both because of the commands
of the First Amendment and the view that judges are policymakers
just like legislators.'3 1
In a remarkable development, four Supreme Court Justices
recently voiced concern about the effects of politicization on state
courts.' 32 They noted polling data that show "fear that people will
lose trust in the system," and concern that "campaign contributions
and political pressure will make judges accountable to politicians
and special interest groups instead of the law and the Constitution."133 A core issue is whether the state judiciary can protect
individual rights. As we move toward judicial elections that yield
judges who look like legislators, the question inevitably arises
whether those judges can protect citizens from those legislators and
the officials who execute their laws. The Challengers will have won
a Pyrrhic victory if their litigation successes lead to a state judiciary
that the federal judiciary does not trust. Protecting rights might be
seen as a relatively small proportion of the state courts' workload,
but it is a vitally important one, both symbolically and practically.
131. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (noting the power
of state judges to "make" common law).
132. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2687 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2687 n.2. Because of the extraordinary nature of this commentary by four
Supreme Court Justices on the condition of the state judiciary, it is set forth in its entirety:
State judicial campaigns have become flush with cash as well, with state
supreme court candidates raising over $30 million in the 2005-2006 cycle. In a
single 2004 judicial election in Illinois, the candidates raised a breathtaking $9.3
million, an amount the winner called "obscene." The Justice-elect wondered,
"How can people have faith in the system?" According to polling data, the fear
that people will lose trust in the system is well founded. With respect to judicial
elections, a context in which the influence of campaign contributions is most
troubling, a recent poll of business leaders revealed that about four in five
thought that campaign contributions have at least "some influence" on judges'
decisions, while 90 percent are at least "somewhat concerned" that "campaign
contributions and political pressure will make judges accountable to politicians
and special interest groups instead of the law and the Constitution."
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). These four Justices-Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-are the White dissenters. Their emphasis is on money, but clearly goes
beyond it to a general unease with the highly politicized system that White helps bring about.
Their dissent may have an element of"we told you so." Former Justice O'Connor has recently
voiced similar sentiments on politicized state judiciaries. Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed.,
Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25.
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The Challengers might claim that issues of federal rights will not
enter into electoral debates. In White, Justice Scalia referred to the
role of state courts in shaping state constitutions.1 34 But constitutional adjudication frequently involves both state and federal
claims, often closely interwoven. The judge who does not want to
face the electoral backlash of releasing a notorious criminal on a
"technicality" is not likely to take a different approach to federal
technicalities than to state ones. It is naive to assume that federal
law issues will not play a role in state judicial elections. The
Alabama advertisements discussed earlier brought up enforcement of federal court orders on same-sex marriage. 1 35 Indeed, one
136
candidate "suggested defiance of U.S. Supreme Court precedent"
in the criminal law context. Questionnaires in Kentucky and
North Carolina "asked judicial candidates to agree or disagree
with the following statement: 'I believe that Roe v. Wade was
wrongly decided." 137 A Kentucky judicial candidate stated his
support for "having the Ten Commandments in our schools and
courthouses.' 3 8
Conservatives have always emphasized the symbolic aspects of
federalism, and rightly so. This concern also extends to the practical
dimensions of the parity-based doctrines. It is not a victory for
conservatives if the politicized state courts are viewed as hierarchically inferior tribunals whose vital operations require federal
supervision. As Solimine and Walker put it, the parity decisions are
"a challenge to maintain and enhance the quality of state judicial
systems.' 3 9 Professor Bator also stressed "[t]he importance of
creating and maintaining conditions that assure that, in the long
run, the state courts will be respected and equal partners with the
lower federal courts in the enterprise of formulating and enforcing
federal constitutional principles."'4 ° Beyond substantive rights rests
the issue of the basic fairness of state courts, their ability to provide
procedural due process. From a conservative perspective, focusing
134. White, 536 U.S. at 784 ("Not only do state-court judges possess the power to 'make'
common law, but they have the immense power to shape the states' constitutions as well.").
135. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
136. JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 4.
137. Id. at 30.
138. Id. at 36.
139. Solimine & Walker, supranote 16, at 253.
140. Bator, supra note 90, at 627.
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on these values, it is hard to see politicization as anything but a step
backward.
B. From JudicialFederalism to General Federalism:Difference
and Experimentation
Judicial federalism arguments depend largely on the "justness"
of state courts and whether they are perceived as equal to the
federal courts in quality and potential fairness. These arguments,
however, lead to more general considerations of federalism,
considerations that depend not so much on the link between the
quality of state courts and the methods of selecting their judges, as
on the value of having different methods. This value reflects
fundamental aspects of the broader federal system.
1. Difference as a Value in Itself
Professor Steven Calabresi puts the basic case for federalism in
these terms:
The opening argument for state power is that social tastes and
preferences differ, that those differences correlate significantly
with geography, and that social utility can be maximized if
governmental units are small enough and powerful enough so
that local laws can be adapted to local conditions, something the
national government, with its uniform lawmaking power, is
largely unable to do.' 4'
"Local laws" surely include those by which a state organizes and
regulates its governmental organization. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 42
the Supreme Court declared that the manner in which a state
organizes itself is an important element of how it defines its
sovereignty.1 43 This general principle suggests that there might
well be several different ways of structuring a state judiciary,
including the method of its selection. Professor Schotland describes
141. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers" In Defense
of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 775 (1995).
142. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
143. See id. at 460 ('Through the structure of its government, and the character of those
who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a Sovereign.").
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as "striking" the manner in which "the states vary the selection
systems for their different courts."1 44 He identifies fifteen varieties
of selection methods. 14 These include different uses of the election
technique.14
Such a range of differences is obviously an example of federalism
in operation. The question then becomes whether the ability to
choose the election method includes the power to regulate the
election in ways that make it, for example, more or less political. In
a critique of White, Wendy Weiser has argued that attempts to
reduce politicization of the election of judges are an attempt to
create an independent judiciary, in particular, one independent of
the political branches. 147 She answers affirmatively the question of
whether the state can regulate the election with an eye to determining the nature of the institution, the down-the-road question. For
her, the Canons, including the one struck down in White, "are part
of a broader institutional design by which Minnesota defines and
controls its judiciary.' 4 8
Minnesota's system of judicial elections cannot be understood
apart from the carefully crafted constitutional and statutory
scheme of which it is a part. The structure and provisions of the
state constitution all point to the conclusion, recognized by the
state's supreme court, that this scheme was designed primarily
to preserve judicial independence within a structure of separated
powers. Instead of using the federal methods of appointment and
life tenure, Minnesota pursues this ideal through a variety of
other mechanisms aimed at insulating judges and judicial
candidates from political pressures. Over time, and in response
[to] the state's experience, Minnesota has tinkered with these
mechanisms to better achieve its constitutional goal. The
overriding goal, however, has remained the establishment of an
independent judiciary protected from political
pressures from
149
both the political branches and the public.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Schotland, supra note 3, at 1084.
See id.
See id. at 1085-86.
See Weiser, supra note 4, at 655, 664, 668-72, 688-91.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 671.
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In other words, states should not only be free to choose to have an
elected judiciary, but should also be free to decide how to protect it
from forces that can reasonably be viewed as preventing it from
acting in a judicial manner. The freedom is not absolute; the First
Amendment obviously applies to all elections. The question is
whether federalism values argue against an absolutist view of the
amendment that pushes elected state judiciaries toward looking like
political branches in derogation of their judicial nature. Federalism
suggests that states ought to be able to regulate judicial elections so
as to "preserve judicial independence within a structure of separated powers. 15 °
2. Experimentation:The Laboratory Theory at Work
What the Article presents here as the presumptive conservative
argument against politicization thus draws strong support from
another closely related basic principle of federalism: the 'laboratory"
theory, or the value of experimentation. The very fact that states
differ permits them to approach problems differently. The most
famous statement of this aspect of federalism is Justice Brandeis's:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. 151
State experimentations in governance obviously have value beyond
the realm of the "social and economic." Indeed, the question of how
best to regulate election of judges would seem a good example of
experimentation, given its importance, controversial nature, and the
wide range of opinions on the subject. The point is not just that
states can differ from the federal model of appointed judges, but
that difficult questions of how to accommodate the institution of
elected judges with rule of law values argue for states offering
150. Id. at 664.
151. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

1574

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1543

differing answers. 152 An important article by Professor William
Marshall on campaign finance reform 153 provides helpful insights.
Writing at a time of great uncertainty over federal campaign finance reform efforts, Marshall proposed that "[t]he regulation of
campaign finance of federal election matters could be devolved to
the states."15' 4 He contended that "if the states are experimenting
with different types of reform, the problems inherent in particular
may become apparent more quickly by virtue of compariproposals
1 55
son."'
There are striking parallels between campaign finance reform
and judicial election reform. Judicial election regulation is a type of
56
campaign reform, and clearly related to campaign finance reform. 1
Regulating judicial elections presents the same First Amendment
problem that the Court's campaign finance cases have grappled with
5 One can say of White what Marshall said
since Buckley v. Valeo."'
of Buckley: 'The most likely benefit to First Amendment concerns
is that increased litigation might allow the Constitutional issues left
open as ambiguous in Buckley to percolate into a more coherent
doctrine."' 58 This Article's point is not to argue that federalism
values trump the First Amendment, but to establish a presumption
that conservatives (presumably staunch federalists)'5 9 should look
with favor on states' efforts to structure their judicial elections, and
with dismay on the phenomenon of politicization, in particular its
effects on notions of parity and federalism in general. Thus, they

152. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 705, 821 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Schotland, supranote 35, at 81-86 (discussing the problem of accountability and
differing approaches).
153. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for CampaignFinanceReform, 94 Nw.

U. L. REv. 335 (2000).
154. Id. at 376.
155. Id. at 380.
156. See Weiser, supra note 4, at 695.
157. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Weiser, supra note 4, at 696. In the White remand, the
Eighth Circuit was divided over the relevance of the Supreme Court's anti-corruption cases.
Compare Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 756 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), with
id. at 769 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
158. Marshall, supra note 153, at 380; see also id. at 385 ("Crafting reforms that navigate
between competing interests is not easy.... Finally, the unsettled constitutional law
surrounding campaign reform favors experimentation.").
159. See generally Fallon, supra note 15.
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should seek to fit those efforts within the First Amendment, rather
than contend that it forbids them.
3. Who Are the True Federalistsin the JudicialElection Debate?
Those who tend to agree with the argument to this point would
probably also agree with the following statement:
By recognizing a conflict between the demands of electoral
politics and the distinct characteristics of the judiciary, we do
not have to put States to an all or nothing choice of abandoning
1 °
judicial elections or having elections in which anything goes. '
This statement, however, is from Justice Stevens's dissent in White.
The majority saw the case as presenting essentially a First Amendment problem. Once Minnesota chose to elect its justices, the
Amendment governed the process to the same extent it would
govern any other election.16 ' Strict scrutiny allowed little room for
state regulation of judicial campaigns. The closest thing to a
discussion of federalism in the majority's opinions is found in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 162 But it was hardly an endorsement of state freedom. For Justice O'Connor, once the state had
chosen to select judges through contested elections, it had "voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias.... "163 She continued, "If the
State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the
State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly
electing judges."1'64 In other contexts, Justice O'Connor has been a
champion of federalism generally, and of the laboratory theory in
particular.16
A more extensive judicial discussion of federalism concerns is
found in the Eighth Circuit's en banc consideration of two further
160. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799-800 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

161. Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
that California's program of legalized medicinal marijuana "exemplifies the role of States as
laboratories").
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Minnesota Canons in the remand of White from the Supreme
Court.16 6 The court struck down both Canons, one of which dealt
with partisan activity, and one of which dealt with solicitation of
campaign contributions. 7 The court acknowledged the importance
of state sovereignty and recognized that "[s]tates have wide
authority to set up their state and local governments as they
wish."'68 Even if viewed as "concurrent," however, state sovereignty
is subject to the Supremacy Clause.' 69 Thus federal rights can be
curtailed as part of the structuring process only if federal constitutional doctrine permits it. 170 In the case of political speech, protected
by the First Amendment, that doctrine is strict scrutiny.'
Thus for the Challengers, who once again prevailed, the presumption against politicization-whether labeled mere policy or policy
grounded in constitutional values-is trumped by the virtually
absolute thrust of the First Amendment rights that they see as
governing all elections, regardless of the office at stake. To them, it
makes no sense for a critic such as Ms. Weiser to say that
"[u]nfortunately, the White decision reads as a straightforward First
Amendment election decision instead of a decision addressing the
complex interplay between competing constitutional values."'7 2 For
the Challengers, that is the point. White was an election case,
nothing more. Even if "constitutional values" are somehow present,
they do not rise to the level of a compelling state interest required
by strict scrutiny. White is obviously the centerpiece of the Challengers' offensive. Before analyzing the case itself, however, this Article
will discuss two important sets of arguments that the Challengers
would likely regard as sufficient by themselves to rebut the
presumption that I have developed above. They would likely contend
that White is not necessary to establish that the true conservative
position is one that favors unfettered speech, and related activities,
in judicial elections.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 747.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; White, 416 F.3d at 747-48.
See White, 416 F.3d at 747-48.
Id. at 749.
Weiser, supra note 4, at 665.

20081

POLITICAL JUDGES AND POPULAR JUSTICE

1577

III. REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION-THE CHALLENGERS AS THE
TRUE CONSERVATIVES

A. The Campaign FinanceReform Trap
1. Conservativesand CampaignFinanceReform
A major theme of conservative legal thought-found in the work
of both judges and academics-is deep skepticism about proposals
for campaign finance reform.17 The Challengers no doubt view
defenders of restrictions on judicial campaigns as falling into
what might be called the campaign finance reform trap: the view
that restricting electoral activities normally protected by the
First Amendment can make elections somehow "better."174 As a
general matter, conservatives have stressed the centrality of First
Amendment freedoms in the electoral context.7 5 They frequently
76 a decision authored by Justice Brennan,
cite Brown v. Hartlage,1
for such propositions as "[t]he free exchange of ideas provides
special vitality to the process traditionally at the heart of American
constitutional democracy-the political campaign.' ', 7 They see
reformers as attempting to use the First Amendment as a grant of
legislative power to achieve political equality by limiting the role of
wealth in the electoral process. Professor Lillian BeVier, a leading
conservative academic, views these efforts as follows: "the rejection
of the prevailing view that the First Amendment has force merely
as a negative restraint on government and that government
regulation of speech is the antithesis of freedom.' ' 7 Professor
173. E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 248 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See generally Smith, supra note 23.
174. See Dimino, supra note 3, at 376; see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Elections,
Campaign Financing, and Free Speech, 2 ELECTION L.J. 79 (2003) (emphasizing the
implications of White for campaign finance reform generally).
175. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
177. Id. at 53.
178. Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1260 (1994); see also Smith, supra note 23, at 1057
("Reformers have failed to show why a system of campaign finance that has existed
throughout the nation's history must be overturned. They have failed to prove that new,
unique circumstances justify infringement of First Amendment rights, or even that these
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Allison Hayward sees a sharp contrast between a Madisonian
"preference for leaving political activity free from governmental
control,"1'79 and Progressive "social engineering ideals"'8 ° aimed at
a "constitutional democracy-enhancing 'purpose.'1, 8 The enhancement would come from elimination of private influence based on
wealth in the operation of the political system.
It is not immediately apparent that regulating judicialelections
represents the same type of broad social goals. Nonetheless, the two
forms of regulation are linked by a number of themes, including the
perceived need to circumscribe First Amendment freedoms. 182 In the
next two subsections, this Article discusses two of those themes of
special interest to conservatives: the risk that reform equals
entrenchment, and the relationship between campaign regulations
and the redistribution of political power.
2. Entrenchment
A frequent criticism of campaign finance reform proposals is that
they are designed by incumbent officeholders and will work to
entrench incumbent officeholders. As Professor BeVier puts it,
"protection of incumbents tends to be a wolf too readily disguised in
the sheep's clothing of reform."'83 Incumbents can "reform" the system in a way that preserves the advantages of incumbency while
making it harder for challengers to overcome them. Dissenting
8 4 Justice Scalia
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,"
infringements will cure the alleged ills.").
179. Allison Hayward, The Fallacy of Campaign FinanceReform, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
Soc'Y PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 2006, at 185, available at http:l/www.fed-soc.orgldoclib/20070321EngageOct06.pdf (reviewing JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
(2006)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. The campaign finance cases do not play any significant role in White. Justice
Ginsburg's dissent did, however, discuss such concepts as the "compelling state interest [in]
preserving the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its judiciary."
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 817 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Such
an "appearance" analysis is similar to that found in the campaign finance cases. See also
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 769-70 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (identifying unifying themes in campaign finance cases, judicial elections cases,
and Hatch Act restrictions on executive branch employees).
183. BeVier, supra note 178, at 1259.
184. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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outlined the connection between the First Amendment and the
entrenchment problem. He first described the "heart" of First
'
Amendment protection as "the right to criticize the government."1 85
He then noted that the legislation before the Court (the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act) would operate to limit criticism of incumbents.'8 6 Here is how he described the link to the First Amendment:
To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It similarly prohibits
criticism of the candidates who oppose Members of Congress in
their reelection bids. But as everyone knows, this is an area in
which evenhandedness is not fairness. If all electioneering were
evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous
advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are limited
to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are favored.
In other words, any restriction upon a type of campaign speech
that is equally available
to challengers and incumbents tends to
187
favor incumbents.

How should one apply what Professor BeVier calls the "premise
of distrust"'8 8 to the network of Canon-based regulations of judicial
elections? It certainly is reform in the general "good government"
sense that one might apply to campaign finance reform. The
Challengers can draw on conservative critiques of the latter to point
out serious entrenchment problems. The argument runs as follows.
The state canons are generally drawn up by members of the local
legal establishment and promulgated by the state's highest court.
Thus, the particular body promulgating them has a direct interest
in their effect. Moreover, incumbent judges at all levels, as well as
state bar insiders, have an interest. These interests are served by
low visibility elections that favor incumbents and disfavor challengers. Preventing politicization, as described earlier in this Article,
serves this goal directly. Thus state canons are likely to forbid
pledges, promises, or commitments about how a candidate would

185. Id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 249.
187. Id. He then analyzed particular features of the legislation that would favor
incumbents. See also Hayward, supra note 179, at 186 (discussing the historical evidence of
entrenchment).
188. BeVier, supra note 178, at 1279.
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decide cases, 189 and to limit candidates' fundraising activities, 190 or

establish nonpartisan elections. 9 '
Referring to a nonpartisan state canon, the Eighth Circuit stated
that its fruits "appear to bear witness to its remarkably proincumbent character."' Most observers, whatever their ideological
perspective, agree on this point. Professor Chemerinsky, an opponent of the Canons, states that "[v]oters rarely know enough
about judicial candidates to make a knowledgeable choice.' 93
Professor Schotland, a supporter, quotes other scholars to the effect
that "[t]raditionally, 'political campaigns for judicial posts [were] as
exciting as a game of checkers ...
[p]layed by mail ....
' [They were]
'low-key affairs conducted with civility and dignity."' 194 Writing from
a general election law perspective, Dean Briffault describes judicial
elections as "traditionally ...
low salience events, with low public

interest, very low free media coverage, and, as a result, low voter
95 He views this state of affairs as burdening challengturnout."'
96
ers.1

Not surprisingly, conservatives have made the connection
between campaign reform generally and judicial election reform.
Professor Rotunda writes that "White ...
and its rationale suggest

that the Court will be wary of campaign reform legislation that is
disguised as incumbent protection legislation."'97 Conservatives
view Canon-based judicial election reforms as not only aimed at
keeping some people in, but at keeping them out. Professor Stern
has noted the phenomenon of conservative groups fighting restrictions on candidates expressing their views on social issues such
as abortion and same-sex marriage.' 9 Candidates and judges who
get into trouble under existing regulations tend to be those who
express conservative views such as a "tough on crime" stance. 99 To
189. MCJC 2007, supra note 5, at R. 4.1(A)(13).
190. Id. R. 4.1(A)(8).
191. Id. R. 4.1(A)(1)-(2); Briffault, supranote 2, at 181.
192. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 758 n.9 (8th Cir. 2005).
193. Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 753.
194. Schotland, supra note 3, at 1079 (internal citation omitted).
195. Briffault, supra note 2, at 196.
196. See id.; see also Dimino, supra note 3, at 374-75.
197. Rotunda, supra note 174, at 89.
198. Stern, supra note 88, at 98-100.
199. See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80 (Fla. 2003) (finding that a judicial candidate's
use of campaign literature stating that she would "help law enforcement by putting criminals
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the extent, then, that this Article has posed the question whether
the Challengers can rebut the presumption against politicization
posited in Part II, the entrenchment argument that conservatives
have advanced in the campaign finance context is a point in their
favor.
3. Judicial CampaignRegulation as Social Engineering
Another theme of the conservative critique of campaign finance
reform is that it represents social engineering in at least two
respects. On a specific level, it represents an attempt to alter the
rules governing elections in order to achieve "greater democracy," a
more "equal" electoral system. On a general level, reform aims at
using this presumed equality to achieve governmental policies that
are themselves more redistributionist and egalitarian in nature.
Professor BeVier notes the reformers' claim of a "basic tension
between a private market economy and a modern democratic
polity,"20 0 and their assumption of a relationship between "economic
inequalities" and "political inequalities."2 1 Thus, proposals for
campaign finance reform may, in fact, reflect a basic hostility to free
markets and a preference for "collectivized" economic decision
making.0 2
Certainly, some proponents of campaign finance reform are not
shy about voicing such views. According to Jamin Raskin and John
Bonifaz: "In politics, candidates backed with wealth get a longer and
far more respectful hearing than those who are not; in government,
public policy rapidly comes to reflect and reinforce wealth inequalities."0 3 They elaborate as follows:
The systemic degradation of the political influence of the
nonaffluent is best witnessed by government policy. Congress is
far more responsive to the political interests of the wealthy than
the poor, and often acts to the detriment of those who do not
participate in the wealth primary. As political campaign costs
where they belong ... behind bars," was conduct unbecoming of a candidate to a judicial post).
200. BeVier, supra note 178, at 1260 (internal citation omitted).
201. Id. (internal citation omitted).
202. Id. at 1264.
203. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protectionand the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L.
& POLVY REv. 273, 275 (1993).
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and expenditures have soared in the last two decades, poor and
working-class people have steadily lost economic ground, while
wealthy individuals and corporations have been greatly enriched. °4
Although such arguments were dealt a serious setback in Buckley
v. Valeo,2 °6 they are still part of the campaign finance reform
debate.2"' Obviously they are anathema to conservatives. In general,
one could characterize conservatives as highly supportive of the free
market and of the notion that resources acquired in that market can
be deployed to advance one's political views. The question is
whether the effort to regulate judicial elections-here presented as
analogous to campaign finance reform-can in any way be viewed
as an attempt at potentially massive social engineering and an
attack on the existing socio-economic order.
At first blush, the answer clearly seems to be no. The debate
between those described here as the Reformers and the Challengers
seems not to be so much about restructuring the democratic process
to achieve redistributionist goals in the broader society as it seems
to be a debate about how to adapt the imperatives of the democratic
process-particularly its First Amendment dimensions-to the
imperatives of the judicial process. Thus one could conclude that the
conservative critique of this dimension of campaign finance reform
does not carry over to judicial election reform, and does not operate
to rebut the conservative presumption posited in Part II.
204. Id. at 301.
205. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). In Buckley, the Court stated:
It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections
serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of
candidates imposed by [18 U.S.C.] § 608(e)(1)'s expenditure ceiling. But the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed "to secure the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources," and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people."
Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
206. It seems clear that such equality considerations played a role in the Vermont
campaign finance regulation scheme struck down in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006)
(invalidating state limits on expenditures and contributions).
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There is, if anything, a certain amount of conservative
redistributionism in the Challengers' attacks on the Canon-based
system backed by the Reformers. They start with the important
point that different methods of judicial selection will result in
20 7
different degrees of power over the process by participants in it.
The ultimate result will be the selection of judges (and presumably
their decisions once on the bench) congruent with the views of those
who hold the most power. This sounds like the premise of the
campaign finance reformers. In the judicial context, however, the
Challengers appear to be the Robin Hoods. They see the Canonbased system as designed to keep power away from "the lower
classes, ' ' and to make sure that it remains with "elite[s]. 2 °9
To some extent, this argument parallels the conservative critique of campaign finance reform. It is an argument against
entrenchment and a call for an open system in which all forces have
influence. Conservatives who were opposed to social engineering in
the campaign finance context, however, may simply not find it
present in the efforts of the judicial Reformers and the Canon-based
system. Indeed, some conservatives may be uncomfortable with the
populism of the Challengers. Obviously, as noted above, there is no
2 1 Some who wear the
all-embracing definition of "conservative.""
label are comfortable with the elitism of the framers.2 11 In the
judicial context, other conservatives see more open elections, more
politicization, as a means of taking back the law and diminishing
the role of elites. A recent profile of James Bopp describes his views
as follows: "Judges making law according to the values of the people
is a good thing. 2 12 Whenever a state has opted for an elected
judiciary, the argument runs, the elections must be as open as
those for any other office. That is why so many of the Challengers
207. Dimino, supra note 3, at 313 & n.76 (describing judicial selection systems from an
"interest group politics" perspective).
208. Id. at 375.
209. Id. at 377 (citing W. Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First
Amendment in JudicialElection Campaigns, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 105 (2001)).
210. See supra note 15 (defining conservatives as those who "generally agree with judges
such as Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas" and support federalism).
211. See Dimino, supra note 3, at 309-10.
212. Terry Carter, The Big Bopper, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 31, 33. The quote is from the
author of the article paraphrasing Bopp's statement, rather than a direct quote from Mr.
Bopp.
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are conservatives, especially those concerned with social issues, who
regard the Canon-based system as shutting them out. Overall, I do
not dispute that conservative opposition to campaign finance reform
may carry over, to some extent, to judicial campaign reform. (I am
referring to policy objections based on calculations of likely winners
and losers, rather than First Amendment issues. These are dealt
with in my analysis of White.)2 1 The entrenchment objection seems
stronger than the social engineering-based objection, which is
considerably more problematic. Putting aside the fact that some
conservatives favor some aspects of campaign finance reform,21 4 I do
not think the parallels are sufficiently strong to rebut the presumption against politicization.
B. PopularControl Over the Judiciaryand Conservative Values
As suggested above, whatever attempts at social engineering are
present in the debate over Canon-based regulation may, in fact, be
coming from conservatives. The Challengers can thus seek to rebut
the presumption by arguing that politicization of judicial elections
leads to greater popular control of the judiciary, which advances
conservative values. The argument might run as follows: judges
make law; if elected, their elections should mirror those of other
lawmakers so as to best reflect the popular will. A true reflection
of the popular will can be expected to lead to more conservative
outcomes in such fields as social issues and criminal justice.2 15 For
conservatives, these gains ought to outweigh theoretical constructs
such as judicial federalism.
An initial response to this argument is that it is in some tension
with the doctrine of separation of powers, a staple of both state and
federal constitutional law. The contention suggests a blending of
the judiciary and the political branches rather than a distinction.
Dean Briffault offers the following observation on one aspect of the
general problem:

213. See infra Part III.C.
214. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, President Signs Campaign Finance Reform
Act (Mar. 27,2002), availableat httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020327.
html.
215. See Stern, supranote 88, at 98-104.
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Judicial independence is linked to impartiality since only a judge
independent of outside pressures can impartially apply the law
to all the parties who appear before her. But independence also
implicates the separation of powers and the freedom of the
courts from the other branches of government.... [Ilndependence
has been treated as particularly important for the courts, as it
enables judges to pursue their special role in protecting the
constitutional rights of minorities and vindicating the rule of law
even for unpopular parties. The executive and legislative
branches have to work together in order for government to
function as a whole. But the independence of the courts from the
assertedly more political branches is essential if the courts are
to apply the rule of law and protect minorities. As a result,
although we celebrate the role of political parties in linking up
the separate houses of a bicameral legislature, the legislature
with the executive, and the different levels of our federal system
to facilitate more effective governance, if the parties were
comparably effective in coordinating the actions of the courts
with the other branches, the capacity of the courts to carry out
their duties could be seriously undermined.2 16
Obviously, judicial independence extends beyond independence
from political parties to relations between the courts and the electorate itself. The very concept of an elected judiciary creates a
separation of powers problem. 217 Yet the majority opinion in White
seems careful to affirm the constitutionality of the elected judiciary.2 1 Perhaps one should restate the Challengers' linking of
untrammelled elections to conservative values as a theoretical]
institutional position after all-a defense of the institution of elected
state courts and a desire to maximize their legitimacy. In this sense,
the argument is more about theory than outcomes.
Certainly, the issue of legitimacy appears frequently in discussions of the institution.1 9 According to Professor Gibson:
216. Briffault, supra note 2, at 199 (footnote omitted).

217. At most, under this view politicization exacerbates the separation of powers problem.
218. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782-83 (2002) (noting that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "has coexisted with the election of judges ever
since it was adopted"). But see id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I am concerned that ...
the very practice of electing judges undermines [an impartial judiciary].").
219. See, e.g., id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch
ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."); id. at 818
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Social scientists have long been concerned with understanding
the legitimacy of all political institutions, but of courts in
particular. Every institution needs political capital in order to be
effective, to get its decisions accepted by others, and to be
successfully implemented. Because courts are typically thought
to be weak institutions-having neither the power of the "purse"
(control of the treasury) nor the "sword" (control over agents of
state coercion)-their political capital must be grounded in
resources other than finances and force. For courts, political
capital can be indexed by institutional legitimacy.
Legitimacy Theory is one of the most important frameworks
we have for understanding the effectiveness of courts in democratic societies. Fortunately, considerable agreement exists
among social scientists and legal scholars on the major contours
of the theory. For instance, most agree that legitimacy is a
normative concept, having something to do with the rightmoral and legal-to make decisions. "Authority" is sometimes
used as a synonym for legitimacy. Institutions perceived to be
legitimate are those with a widely accepted mandate to render
judgments for a political community. "Basically, when people say
that laws are 'legitimate,' they mean that there is something
rightful about the way the laws came about ... the legitimacy of
law rests on the way it comes to be: if that is legitimate, then so
are the results, at least most of the time."22 °
The Challengers can argue that they do not seek to undermine
the legitimacy of state courts. They would recognize that conservative values are furthered by respect for state institutions and a
view of them as legitimate. Indeed, they would no doubt agree with
the judicial federalism argument raised earlier: state courts can
best play their role in the constitutional scheme if their legitimacy
is widely accepted. For the Challengers, conservatives should recognize that- the legitimacy of elected state courts turns on the
openness of the election. As Justice Scalia stated in White, "[i]f the
State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220. Gibson, supra note 52, at 61 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 256 (2d ed. 1998) (internal citations omitted)).
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democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process
... the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles."2 2 '
These contentions are certainly one side of the coin, but conservatives should not view them as dispositive. The debate at the core of
this Article is not over whether elected state court legitimacy is
desirable, but rather how to achieve it. Emphasizing the other side
of the coin, Professor Gibson asserts:
Exposure to legitimizing judicial symbols reinforces the process
of distinguishing courts from other political institutions. The
message of these powerful symbols is that "courts are different,"
and owing to these differences, courts are worthy of more
respect, deference, and obedience-in short, legitimacy. Because
courts use nonpolitical processes of decision making ... and
because judicial institutions associate themselves with symbols
of impartiality and insulation from ordinary political pressures,
those more exposed to courts come to accept the "myth of
legality." This process of social learning explains why citizens
who are more aware of and knowledgeable about courts tend to
adopt less realistic views of how these institutions make
decisions and operate. Thus, courts profit greatly from the
perception that they are not like ordinary political institutions.
They are different owing primarily to their decision-making
processes. Judges are not perceived as self-interested; rather,
they are impartial.
The threat of politicized judicial campaigns is that electioneering activity may undermine the belief that courts are
essentially nonpolitical institutions. Citizens may learn that
courts are quite like other political institutions if that is the
message to which people are exposed during elections. Indeed,
precisely the most worrisome consequence of the politicized style
of judicial elections is that, to the extent that campaigning takes
on the characteristics of "normal" political elections, courts will
be seen as not special and different, with the consequence that
their legitimacy may be undermined. At the most general level,
I hypothesize that those who become aware of and attuned to
campaigns in politicized judicial elections will judge courts and
221. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); see also Dimino,
supranote 3, at 374 ("If judges are to receive the benefit of legitimacy that comes from having
periodic elections, it seems that elections should encourage participation by as many eligible
voters as possible.").
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other political institutions similarly and will therefore extend
less legitimacy to the judiciary.222
Consequently, politicized judicial campaigns may seriously disrupt
the normal supply of legitimacy by portraying judges as nothing
more than ordinary politicians. The general hypothesis of Professor
Gibson's research is thus that politicized campaign activity undermines the perceived impartiality of judicial institutions.
The Challengers' objection to Canon-based regulation may rest on
such notions as an ABA campaign to subvert the elected judiciary
and turn it into something like an appointed one (the ABA's
preferred institutional approach).2 23 But, as Professor Gibson's
observations suggest, regulation is an effort to save it. Moreover, it
may be the case that judges derive their legitimacy more from the
office itself-with its particular traditions and methods of proceeding-than from its method of selection.2 24 Professor Gibson points
to "legitimizing judicial symbols [that reinforce the process] of
'
The
distinguishing courts from other political institutions."2 25
wide variety of selection methods-Professor Schotland identifies
fifteen 2 2 6 -lends support to the view that legitimacy derives from
the office itself. Thus, if conservatives are attracted to the presumption against politicization and the view that it depends on state
courts perceived as viable, then the argument that unfettered
elections are necessary for legitimacy seems unconvincing at best.
If the "soft," theoretical/institutional argument is weak, perhaps
one should focus on the role of unfettered elections in achieving
substantive conservative goals. Such elections are more likely than
regulated ones to lead to outcomes that reflect these goals. Popular
justice will be conservative justice. This is the "strong" argument for
rejecting the presumption against politicization. As a starting point,
it is helpful to consider what state courts do. In White, Justice Scalia
made the following observation:

222. Gibson, supranote 52, at 61 (internal citations omitted).
223. See White, 536 U.S. at 787 (citing repeated expressions by the ABA of its preference
for merit selection).
224. Cf. Weiser, supra note 4, at 672 (emphasizing judicial independence and separation
of powers rather than any particular selection mechanism).
225. Gibson, supranote 52, at 61 (emphasis added).
226. Schotland, supra note 3, at 1084.
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[C]omplete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of
"representative government" might have some truth in those
countries where judges neither make law themselves nor set
aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture
of the American system. Not only do state-court judges possess
the power to "make" common law, but they have the immense
power to shape the States' constitutions as well."'
This focus on the political role of state courts overlooks one of their
core functions: adjudicating disputes and hearing appeals from
those adjudications. Nonetheless, let us begin with the political
dimension in its purest form, the making of state common law. It is
here that the Challengers' appeal to conservatives is strongest.
Unless one is to attempt to resurrect discredited views of oracular
judges finding the law,2 28 it must be conceded that there are
similarities between judicial lawmaking, especially its appeal to
public policy, and legislative lawmaking. Of course, judicial lawmaking takes place in a very different context-resolution of a
particular dispute-and reflects that difference in varied ways, such
as adversary presentation and the role of precedent. Still, it can be
contended that the overall lawmaking enterprise offers enough
similarities that the elections for both positions ought to be equally
open and unfettered-in short, democratic, and, if you will, political.
Popular control over judicial review is considerably more complex.
As the earlier reference to separation of powers suggests,2 29 there is
tension between this control and the judicial function itself. If courts
are completely majoritarian institutions, exactly like legislatures,
it will be difficult for them to protect minorities against legislative
actions that flow from the same electoral base. This is the point
of the separation of powers quote from Dean Briffault."0 On the
other hand, it is perhaps significant that Justice Scalia referred
to state constitutions.2 3 ' They may already be subject to popular
control through easy amendment. In any event, one can regard the
227. White, 536 U.S. at 784.
228. See Dimino, supra note 3,
knowledgeable observer who believes
make) law." (footnote omitted)).
229. See supra text accompanying
230. See supra text accompanying
231. White, 536 U.S. at 784.

at 360 ("[O]ne would be hard pressed to find any
in the 'oracular' theory that judges discover (and do not
notes 216-17.
note 216.
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interplay of forces that shape the making and interpretation of state
constitutional law as largely a matter for the states, as long as
federal norms are not somehow violated.23 2
It is here, however, that the judicial federalism arguments come
into play with a vengeance. State courts also interpret and apply the
federal Constitution.23 3 As noted, that is a key part of their role in
the constitutional plan.234 That exercise cannot be subject to the
whim of fifty state electorates, or any electorate. There will not
always be a dividing line between state and federal constitutional
rights. Many claims will rest on both.235
Any argument for state electoral control over federal constitutional law must fail. Moreover, the potential for influence over
decisions on federal law calls into question the foundational
assumption of parity: that state courts will consider federal claims
within a general framework of openness and neutrality similar to
that found in federal courts. 236 Thus popular control is a two-edged
sword. If politicization leads to a widespread perception of state
judicial hostility toward rights assertion, the federal judiciary may
well pull back from the parity-based doctrines in order to assert a
greater rights enforcing role. In other words, rather than somehow reinforcing state courts, politicization could weaken them in
a vital area. One need not envisage broad-scale nullification-like
applications of federal law, although inhospitable readings are a
distinct possibility, as recent campaigns suggest. Rather, it is the
adjudicatory function of state courts that could play a crucial role in
judicial federalism developments. Parity relies on confidence that
there is a "full and fair" opportunity to raise federal claims in state
proceedings. 237 Trial judges hostile to federal rights have enormous
power to negate that opportunity.

232. Like Justice Scalia, Professor Dimino emphasizes the power of state courts over state
law. See Dimino, supra note 3, at 359.
233. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 83 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing the Washington State Supreme Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 140.
235. This is frequently the case in criminal matters where claims such as an improper
search or seizure can be based on both the federal and state constitutions.
236. See supra Part H.A.
237. Bator, supra note 90, at 625.
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One example in this context is the role of federal habeas corpus.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996238 was
an effort to cut back federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.23 9 It can be seen as a congressional adoption of judicially
developed parity principles.24 Yet the Act leaves "a host of interpretative questions., 241 Fact-intensive inquiries are frequent.224423
Difficult issues arise regarding such matters as equitable tolling
and "structural error. 24 4
Obviously, the extent to which the federal courts have confidence
in the state courts will be a driving force in the spirit and scope of
habeas review. A highly politicized state judiciary whose members
have committed themselves to obtaining convictions is likely to
receive diminished confidence. Such politicization will undermine
judicial federalism. One can picture an ironic scenario in which
unfettered popular control leads to more convictions which are then
reversed by federal courts. It is hard to see how this "advance" in
conservative goals does anything to rebut the presumption against
politicization.
A further word needs to be said about politicized justice and
adjudication-the core function of courts, and a function, in some
circumstances, which only they can perform.2 4 5 Courts make
common law, but so do legislatures, albeit in very different ways.
They can overrule judicial decisions that make common law.
Legislatures do not conduct civil trials. They cannot pass a law to
overturn the result in a civil trial.
238. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.).
239. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 98, at 872-73.

240. See Fallon, supranote 15, at 465-66.
241. Id. at 466.
242. See, e.g., Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 469 (6th Cir. 2006); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d
964, 975 (9th Cir. 2006); Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 175 F. App'x 142, 143 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 127 S. Ct. 1247 (2007).
243. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Czerniak, 202 F. App'x 288, 289 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 2250 (2007).
244. See Denial of Right to Counsel at 'CriticalStage' Didn't Give Rise to Presumption of
Prejudice,75 U.S. L. WK. 1550, 1551 (2007) ("Application of the principles described in these
[habeas] cases has proven to be fertile ground for fundamental disagreements among state
and federal judges on whether and how to apply harmless-error analysis to violations of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
245. See infra text accompanying notes 338-50.
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To say that the legislative and judicial functions are fundamentally different is not to make the naive assertion that courts do not
make policy. The Challengers seem to assume that any attempt to
emphasize the value of neutrality rests on this assumption.
However, neutrality in adjudication is essential, a point reinforced
by the notion of separation of powers.2 4' Neutrality in the conduct
of a trial requires a decision maker who is not subject to pressure
from the parties or, a fortiori, from the public at large. 24' There is
something contrary to this ideal in the notion of an adjudicator
campaigning on how he or she is going to adjudicate. The existence
of political "debts," especially campaign contributions, "owed" to
parties who then litigate before the debtor raises the same concerns.
Parties in high profile cases have claimed that due process required
recusal when a donor was before a judge.24 8 The Supreme Court has
so far declined to review these cases. 249 But not so long ago it
refused to review punitive damages awards challenged on due
process grounds. 2' 0 Now it does. 251 Again there is the possibility that
federal court distrust of politicized state courts will affect relations
between the two systems. The notion of popular control over the
judiciary raises interesting and complex questions. It is sufficiently
problematic that it is doubtful many conservative analysts of the
judiciary will see it as sufficiently strong to rebut the presumption
against politicization.
C. The Challengers'Trump Card-An Analysis and Critique of
White
Let us assume that conservative readers agree with the analysis
to this point: that the conservative policy arguments against
regulation do not rebut the presumption against politicization. At
this point the Challengers can play their trump card-White-to
246. See supratext accompanying notes 75, 147-50.
247. Cf. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,"123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1289 (1975)
(emphasizing the importance of a neutral decision maker).
248. See, e.g., Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 669 N.W.2d 265, 265-66 (Mich. 2003).
249. See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (IIl. 2005), cert.
denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006).
250. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 27677 (1989).
251. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
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prove not only that they have a Supreme Court precedent, but that
the law and policy of the First Amendment are squarely on their
side.
1. The Decision
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme Court,
by a margin of five to four, struck down Minnesota's Announce
Clause.2 52 That clause stated that a "candidate for a judicial office,
including an incumbent judge," shall not "announce his or her views
on disputed legal or political issues."25 Although lower courts had
narrowed it to "reach only disputed issues that are likely to come
before the candidate if he is elected judge,"2'54 Justice Scalia, for
the majority, viewed that as a minimal limitation in light of the
range of legal or political issues that can come before "a judge of
an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction." 5
He emphasized the direct bearing on the First Amendment of
"speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office,"256
and applied strict scrutiny.25 7 Minnesota had advanced preserving
the impartiality of its judiciary, and the appearance thereof, as
compelling state interests.2 5 Justice Scalia, however, viewed the
underlying concept of impartiality as undefined.2 59 He then invoked
three possible definitions, and applied First Amendment analysis to
each.26 0
He viewed the first, and clearest, meaning of impartial as being
to
without bias to a party to a proceeding.26 ' Justice Scalia appeared 262
accept this concept of impartiality as a compelling state interest,
252. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
253. Id. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
254. Id. at 771.
255. Id. at 772 (quoting Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir.
1993)).
256. Id. at 774 (citing decision of lower court, Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d
854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001)).
257. Id. at 774-75 (citing Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222
(1989), and Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)).
258. Id. at 775.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 775-79.
261. Id. at 775-76.
262. Id. at 775. Justice Scalia described lack of bias as the "root meaning" of impartiality.
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but viewed the Announce Clause as aimed at issues rather than
parties."' Thus itcould not be seen as narrowly tailored to further
any interest against party bias.26 4 He dismissed a second possible
reading of impartial as without preconceptions on legal views,
largely on the ground that judges with no views about the law would
be unqualified for the office.265 He considered a possible concept
of impartiality as open-mindedness, but found any measure that
focuses on the campaign period to be underinclusive since judges
and would-be judges make statements about the law all the time.2 6
The opinion might have stopped there. Justice Scalia, however,
continued with an in-depth discussion of the applicability of the
First Amendment to regulation of judicial elections, partly in
response to the dissents, and partly, one suspects, to strike a blow
against such regulation. He invoked cases such as Brown v.
Hartlage267 to emphasize the First Amendment's protection of
candidates' discussion of issues in an election.2 68 Such discussion is
"at the core of [the] electoral process. ' ' 2 " He disclaimed any implication that "the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial
office to sound the same as those for legislative office, 2 70 but stated
that Justice Ginsburg's dissent "greatly exaggerates the difference
between judicial and legislative elections., 27 1 American state courts
do not exist in "complete separation" from representative government, Justice Scalia stated; they possess great power in making
common law and shaping state constitutions.2 72
Justice Scalia finished with a swipe at reformers, such as the
ABA, who would prefer an appointive system, but, by default,
263. Id. at 776-77. In a footnote, he conceded Justice Stevens's point that statements
concerning issues such as an "unbroken record of affirming convictions for rape" might exhibit
a bias against parties. Id. at 777 n.7. Such instances, however, would not suffice to meet a
requirement of narrow tailoring to serve the interest of preventing party bias. Id.
264. Id. at 776-77.
265. Id. at 777-78.
266. Id. at 778-79.
267. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
268. White, 536 U.S. at 781-82 (citing Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214 (1989), Hartlage,456 U.S. 45 (1982), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).
269. Id. at 781 (quoting Eu, 489 U.S. at 222-23).
270. Id. at 783.
271. Id. at 784.
272. Id. ("'This complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of 'representative
government' ... is not a true picture of the American system.").
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attempt to structure systems that do not look like true elections
with the protections mandated by the First Amendment.2 73 He
closed his analysis with a quote from an earlier election case:
The greater power to dispense with elections altogether does not
include the lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of
state-imposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses to tap the
energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it
must accord the participants in that process ... the First Amend-

ment rights that attach to their roles.274

In sum, Justice Scalia treated White as a case about elections and
the First Amendment rather than a case about judicial elections
and the First Amendment. This seems clear despite his several
disclaimers and suggestions that the Amendment might permit
"greater regulation of judicial election campaigns than legislative
election campaigns."2 7' 5 The key is not just his repeated citation of
First Amendment election cases. It lies in his virtual equation of
judicial elections with elections to other political offices,27 6 and his
insistence that the 'legitimizing" role of elections requires one set
of rules.2 7 7 This requirement flows from a focus on how the judiciary
is chosen and a view that its functions-at the state level-are not
all that different from those of the (other) political branches. To
view the matter this way seriously undercuts any effort to promulgate special rules for judicial elections if they raise First Amendment questions.7 In other words, White may signal the end of a
wide range of reforms, well beyond the Announce Clause.2 79
Although joining the majority opinion, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy wrote separate concurrences.2 80 Each touched obliquely on
federalism-an issue that the Court ignored-although not in the
way that one might expect. Justice O'Connor expressed doubts
273. Id. at 787-88.
274. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
275. Id. at 783.
276. See id. at 784.
277. Id. at 787-88 (quoting Renne, 501 U.S. at 349).
278. See generally Stern, supra note 88, at 81.
279. Id.
280. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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about the elected judiciary as an institution. She noted problems
that could arise from judges needing to please the electorate and
raise money for campaigns, particularly from lawyers.2"' Minnesota
could not, however, attempt to remedy these problems through
restricting speech." 2 She noted, "If the State has a problem with
judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself
by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."28 Justice
Kennedy emphasized the First Amendment aspects of the case,
particularly his view that the state was attempting to regulate
speech based on its content. 28 He too sounded the theme that the
state had chosen to elect its judges.2 8 5 He expressed, however, some
sympathy for the institution and for efforts to regulate it, such as a
code of conduct or tough recusal standards:
What Minnesota may not do, however, is censor what the people
hear as they undertake to decide for themselves which candidate
is most likely to be an exemplary judicial officer. Deciding the
relevance of candidate speech is the right of voters, not the
State. The law in question here contradicts the principle that
unabridged speech is the foundation of political freedom.2
Thus the five "conservative" justices abandoned federalism in favor
of other goals: perhaps a First Amendment absolutism in the
electoral context, perhaps an opposition to campaign regulation, or
perhaps a belief that unfettered elections would further conservative outcomes.28 7
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and
Souter, each authored dissenting opinions.2 Federalism plays only
a limited role in their analyses. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
mainly took issue with the majority's First Amendment analysis by
focusing on the unique characteristics of the judicial branch and the
281. Id. at 788-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 792.
283. Id.

284. Id. at 794-95 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 795.
286. Id. at 794 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)).
287. See generally Fallon, supra note 15 (advancing the possibility that conservative
justices may, in particular cases, be willing to abandon federalism in order to promote
substantive goals).
288. White, 536 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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relationship between those characteristics and political campaigns.
Justice Stevens criticized the Court for "obscuring the fundamental
distinction between campaigns for the judiciary and the political
branches."28' 9 He emphasized the differences between the two types
of branches. Members of the political branches need to be
"popular,"2" but judges deal with "issues of law or fact [that] should
not be determined by popular vote."29 ' Judges do not serve constituencies. 29 2 Because there is a conflict between "the demands of
electoral politics and the distinct characteristics of the judiciary, '29 3
states need not be put to "an all or nothing choice of abandoning
'
judicial elections or having elections in which anything goes."294
Justice Stevens thus took issue with the majority's implicit
general assumption that elections to any office should be governed
by the same First Amendment standards. For him, a difference
in the nature of the office could trigger a difference in the degree
of regulation of electoral speech. Thus the state could sanction
statements that effectively convey the message 'Vote for me because
I believe X, and I will judge cases accordingly. '29 He also took issue
with the majority's specific analysis of impartiality. Campaign
statements touting unbroken records of affirming rape convictions
"imply a bias in favor of a particular litigant (the prosecutor) and
against a class of litigants (defendants in rape cases)., 29" He also
addressed the Court's third definition of impartiality: open-mindedness. He contended that statements prohibited by the Announce
Clause frequently demonstrate a lack of open-mindedness or the
appearance thereof.29 7 Finally, he expressed concern that the
legitimacy of the judicial branch-which he saw as resting on "its
reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship"2 9 8-- could be
threatened by "electioneering."2 9' 9
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
Muniz,

Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 800-01.
Id. at 801-02.
Id. at 802 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 288 U.S. 361, 407 (1989)).
Id. at 802-03. He quoted at length from an article by an elected judge, Paul J. De
Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial Independence, 38
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Justice Ginsburg's somewhat longer dissent sounded many of the
same themes."' She emphasized the nonmajoritarian nature of the
judiciary-a branch "owing fidelity to no person or party"3°-and
the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary as
a compelling state interest.0 2 There are several aspects of her
opinion that take the analysis further.
First, and most importantly, she was more explicit in making
the link between the nature of the office and the process of election
to it. For her, the fact that an election is involved is not the end
Cases like Brown v. Hartlage govern
of First Amendment' 'analysis.
"political elections," 3 but they do not dictate a "unilocular, 'an
election is an election,' approach." ' 4 Because of the differences
between the political and judicial functions,0 5 the First Amendment
permits "an election process geared to the judicial office."3 6 The
central premise of this argument is thus that the conduct of the
election can affect the functioning of the office. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg goes so far as to say that "[t]he ability of the judiciary to
discharge its unique role rests to a large degree on the manner in
which judges are selected."30 7 Thus, contrary to Justice Scalia, she
would allow a state to regulate its elected judiciary to further the
goals that the federal government furthers through appointment.
Having taken this analytical step, Justice Ginsburg found the
Announce Clause to be aimed at statements that are incompatible with the judicial office. 0 8 Moreover, she tied that clause to
Minnesota's broader system, including its Pledges or Promises
Clause.30 9 After White, candidates can make pledges or promises by

WILLAMETME L. REV. 367 (2002).
300. White, 536 U.S. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 804.
302. Id. at 817-18.
303. Id. at 806.
304. Id. at 805.
305. For example, decisions of individual cases should not depend on popular will. Id. at
806.
306. Id. at 805.
307. Id. at 804.
308. Id. at 810-11. She placed considerable emphasis on the narrowing construction of the
clause by the courts below, which would exempt general statements of views.
309. Id. at 812-13.
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labeling them as announcements of views, even though the two are
functionally similar. 1 °
A third important feature of Justice Ginsburg's dissent is her
extensive discussion of the Court's precedents dealing with judicial
due process. 3" Her goal was to show that regulation of judicial
elections presents a situation where "constitutionally protected
interests ... lie on both sides of the legal equation."3" 2 She began with
Tumey v. Ohio,"' a case in which a judge had a direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome of cases.3" 4 She argued that Tumey had been
extended to cases that present a temptation to rule in a certain way,
which leads to a probability of unfairness.3 1 5 Party bias cannot be
the sole issue. States may enact prophylactic measures to deal with
situations such as campaign promises that create a probability that
a judge will rule a certain way.31 6
Finally, although it was not a major portion of her opinion,
Justice Ginsburg's opinion raised questions of federalism. She rejected the notion that the states should be forced to "choose one pole
or the other. 31 7 She saw the states as faced with the difficult task
of reconciling "the complex and competing concerns in this sensitive
area."318 Thus, she argued for deference to state "experiment[s]" in
balancing "the constitutional interests in judicial integrity and
free
31 9
expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary."
2. A Critiqueof White and the Question of How Broadly To
Read It
Limited to its facts, White might not seem a major decision. The
Announce Clause was regarded as constitutionally vulnerable 320 and
310. Id. at 819-20.
311. Id. at 813-17.
312. Id. at 813 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000)).
313. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
314. In Tumey, a local mayor serving as judge received a portion of fines that he levied. Id.
at 520.
315. White, 536 U.S. at 814-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Ward v. Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972)).
316. Id. at 815-17.
317. Id. at 821.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See Stern, supra note 88, at 108 ("The Court therefore did not have to pronounce on
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was not a central feature of Canon-based regulation.3 2 ' The analysis
in White indicates a decision of potentially great precedential force,
however. As commentators have pointed out,322 Justice Scalia's
analysis can be read as equating judicial elections with other
elections to the point that the First Amendment applies with full
force in every case. White may signal the downfall of virtually all the
Canons. 2 3 Certainly the lower
courts, particularly the federal
32 4
courts, have read it broadly.
This subsection will argue that the Challengers' trump card is
not as strong as they claim (although admittedly their claims have
so far generally been successful). The legal arguments are not
sufficiently strong to override the presumption against politicization. The Challengers might contend that the presumption is
only a policy argument3--even if based on constitutional values
-and that White trumps it precisely because White is a decision
emphasizing the constitutional rights of individual candidates.
Close analysis, however, suggests that White is seriously flawed and
should not be read broadly. Its weaknesses flow not only from the
constitutional imperative of separation of powers, but also from the
due process rights of litigants who must appear before elected
judges. Thus, there are constitutional rights "on both sides of the
legal equation."3 2
This Article's critique of White, or at least of any broad reading of
it, rests on disagreement with two fundamental premises of the
decision. The first is that courts, because they make law, are part of
the wider invalidity of campaign speech restrictions in order to strike down this especially
vulnerable provision.").
321. Id. at 68-71 (discussing challenges to speech restrictions).
322. See, e.g., Dimino, supranote 3; Stern, supra note 88.
323. Stern, supra note 88, at 64 ("lilt is reasonable to expect that most attempts to curtail
judicial candidates' speech will suffer the same fate as Minnesota's announce clause.").
324. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005); Weaver v.
Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). But see Pa. Family Inst. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d
351 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (upholding, after giving narrow construction, state Canons on pledges or
promises and commitments).
325. I do not assume that there is always a clear distinction between legal and policy
arguments. Nonetheless, I have based my initial presumption largely on what I regard as
conservative policy about the legal system.
326. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer referred to a situation in which there are constitutional interests on both sides.
In judicial elections, however, we are dealing with rights: the immediate rights of the
candidate and the future due process rights of litigants who must appear before a judge.
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"the enterprise of 'representative government."'3 27 Common law
courts are certainly engaged in the business of making law and
policy. As Professor Dimino argues, anyone who contends otherwise
is falling into the trap of magisterial visions of the judiciary that
have been discredited by legal realism and the work of political
scientists.32 8 As argued above, however, this equation of the judicial
with the political branches glosses over significant differences
between the two.3 29 The White dissenters focused on one such
difference: the fact that the obligations of office are quite different
in the judicial and political branches. Legislators are expected to
have allegiances and to favor their supporters; judges are not.33 °
Justice Ginsburg invoked the ideal of a judiciary "owing fidelity to
no person or party."33 ' Speech is certainly important in the context
of election to the political branches because citizens need to hear the
views of candidates in order to pick a representative.3 3 2 One expects,
for example, legislative candidates to state how they will vote on a
pending bill. For a judicial candidate to state how he will vote in a
pending case would seem to enter the forbidden realm of bias.
Another way to highlight the difference is to focus again on what
the branches do. Judges adjudicate, whereas legislatures generally
do not. The Constitution, to some extent, directly forbids legislatures from doing so. This is the role of the ban on bills of attainder,
a ban which applies both to the states and the federal government.33 3 The Supreme Court has long adhered to the view that "[a]
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without a judicial trial. 33 4 Writing for the Court in United States v.
Lovett, 335 Justice Black wrote that the framers "intended to safeguard the people of this country from punishment without trial by

327. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002).
328. Dimino, supra note 3, at 357-67.
329. See supra Part III.B.
330. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 804.
332. This is the case even if the "representative" adopts the view that he should express
his own views, rather than those of the voters.
333. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.");
id. § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law .....
334. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
335. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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duly constituted courts." ' 6 Professor Tribe sums up the sometimes
complex law in this area as follows:
Most basic of all, trial by legislature-the use of the lawmaking
process, or of a trial-like process in a lawmaking setting, to
inflict punitive disabilities on identifiable persons-would be
radically incompatible with the safeguards provided by trial
Accordingly,
before a neutral judge and an impartial jury ....
Congress or
by
of
attainder
any
bill
of
passage
I
forbids
article
by any state. 37
The specific prohibition against bills of attainder not only tells us
what legislators may not do; it reminds us of the special functions
of courts. They are entrusted with the task of adjudication, in part
because of their removal from the passions and politics prevalent
in legislative bodies.3 38 Indeed, the difference between adjudication
and legislation is a bedrock principle of constitutional and administrative law. An important early case is Londoner v. Denver.33 9
At issue was a special assessment, including a determination of
the amount of benefit to individuals. The Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause required a hearing.3 4 ° Yet, in Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,3 4 1 the Court held
that an individualized hearing was not required before a general
property tax increase. The Court distinguished Londoner in the
following terms: "A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing. 3 4 2
Justice Holmes, for the Court, noted that in the case of general
legislative action, groups can bring political power to bear.343 In
336. Id. at 317.

337. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 641 (3d ed. 2000) (citations
omitted).
338. I recognize that this is an argument against the institution of elected judges generally.
That is why the tempering of passion and politics produced by Canon-based regulation is an
important contribution to the acceptability of the practice. See Editorial, The Best Judges
Business Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at A18.
339. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
340. Id. at 381.

341. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
342. Id. at 446.
343. Id. at 445.
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Justice Holmes's view, adjudication was, at least in its generally
accepted form, not a test of political strength manifested over the
decision maker.34 4 Indeed, the hallmark of an adjudication that
satisfies due process is a neutral decision maker. 45 Obviously, in
the administrative state, many adjudications do not, and need
not, take place before a court. 46 But, as long ago as Wiener v. United
States,3 4 7 the Supreme Court held that the legislative choice to
allocate certain claims to an administrative agency for adjudication
"according to law" conferred on that agency's adjudication of them
an "intrinsic judicial character., 34 ' The agency had to act "on the
merits of each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal
considerations, 3 49 free from political influence.35 ° What is true for
agencies is a fortiori true for courts, the quintessential adjudicative
body.
If, then, one focuses on what courts do and how they do it,
significant differences between the judicial and political branches
become apparent. It is helpful to consider three aspects of the
judicial function: common law making, constitutional interpretation,
and dispute resolution.35 1 I have conceded some similarity of function in common law making, although, even there, much of a court's
job is adjudication, including law application. If the legislative
process has been set in motion, particularly at the stage of floor
debate over new legislation, it seems inaccurate to apply the term
law application, let alone adjudication. The processes for making
new law in the two settings are quite different. Legislatures engage
in logrolling, bargain and trade, and extensive interactions with
344. Id.; see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 147 (2d
ed. 2001) (noting that, in the context of individualized determinations, as opposed to
legislative or rule-making decisions, "[t]he power of the group to protect its interests, or a
variety of interests, is no longer a factor").
345. See Friendly, supra note 247, at 1289 (describing a system in which administrative
law judges with no connection to an agency would have the responsibility of developing the
relevant facts and making a just decision).
346. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-57 (2006) (governing adjudications
before administrative agencies).
347. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
348. Id. at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 355-56. The Court was referring to political pressure from one of the other
branches.
351. Obviously, more than one of these aspects can be present in any given case.
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interested persons and groups, both in formal and informal settings.
The kind of ex parte contracts that would be forbidden in an
adjudication are normal and are even expected. Constitutional
interpretation makes the comparison even more problematic. If
legislation is challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying
assumption is that a nonmajoritarian process is being applied to
the outcome of a majoritarian one. Additionally, if one focuses
on adjudication-whether in private dispute resolution or cases
involving government defendants-the difference between the
branches appears with the greatest force.35 2 In sum, it is hard to
argue with the notion of the judiciary as fundamentally different
from the political branches. It seems equally hard to argue that the
existence of an elected judiciary erases these fundamental differences, unless one is prepared to argue that courts with elected
judges represent a different kind of judiciary from those with
appointed judges. In each case, they do the same things in the same
way. At the risk of sounding "unilocular, 3 53 I am inclined to say that
a court is a court.
Even if Justice Scalia is wrong, however, in suggesting that courts
are like legislatures, that does not, by itself, show that elections for
352. I recognize that state courts engage in some broad "public law litigation," and that
such suits are a departure from the bi-polar model which I have highlighted. See Dimino,
supra note 3, at 364. I do not, however, regard such litigation as a major component of the
state court workload. When necessary, this form of litigation channels public participation
into such formalized mechanisms as participation by amici and enlargement of the scope of
the lawsuit, such as adding new parties. The system, however, seeks to follow the adjudicative
rather than the legislative model. There are, of course, other important differences between
the judicial and legislative models. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 716 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("A legislature, unlike the judiciary ... has no obligation to respond to any group's
requests."). The point reinforces the notion of a nonpoliticized judicial process open to all on
an equal basis. Justice Brennan once stated that "[1]egislators, influenced by the passions and
exigencies of the moment, the pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of
business, do not always pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of legislation they
enact." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 814 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan discussed the possibility that James Madison had changed his views on an important
issue concerning the Establishment Clause. He contended that 'Madison's later views may
not have represented so much a change of mind as a change of role, from a Member of
Congress engaged in the hurly-burly of legislative activity to a detached observer engaged in
unpressured reflection." Id. at 815. For Justice Brennan, "the latter role is precisely the one
with which this Court is charged." Id.
353. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 805 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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the two branches can differ insofar as the First Amendment applies.
After all, governors perform quite different functions from legislators, but that does not justify different First Amendment standards
in the context of elections to the two offices. Indeed, this point leads
to the second of Justice Scalia's fundamental premises: that the
strong First Amendment protections enunciated in cases such as
Brown v. Hartlage"4 apply in the same way to all elections. The
premise is perhaps implicit in White. Indeed, Justice Scalia at first
denies relying on it: "[W]e neither assert nor imply that the First
Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same
'
as those for legislative office."355
He not only proceeds to suggest,
however, that there is no meaningful difference between the two
offices-the first premise, discussed above-but goes on to make the
following categorical statement: "If the State chooses to tap the
energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must
accord the participants in that process ... the First Amendment
rights that attach to their roles." '5 6 The statement is a quote from a
separate opinion in an earlier election case involving the rights of
political parties.35 7 Justice Ginsburg was correct in characterizing
his opinion as adopting an "election is an election" approach.35
The question then becomes whether this premise is sound. It has
the advantages of directness, workability, and a privileging of the
First Amendment. All of these aspects explain why White has
proven to be such a powerful precedent.3 59 Yet, that does not make
the premise correct. Analysis of the problem leads to the conclusion
that the Constitution permits a state to vary the rules governing an
election depending on the office to be elected. This governmental
power reaches judicial campaigns and the First Amendment rights
of those who participate in them.
354. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
355. White, 536 U.S. at 783. He also views the Announce Clause as underinclusive, even
if greater regulation of judicial campaigns is possible. It seems clear from his subsequent
analysis, however, that the election law cases are not relied on for the sole purpose of dealing
with inclusiveness.
356. Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
357. Renne, 501 U.S. at 349 (Marshall, J., dissenting). At issue in Renne was a state
constitutional provision prohibiting political parties from endorsing candidates for
nonpartisan offices.
358. White, 536 U.S. at 805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
359. See generally Stern, supranote 88.
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In an important study of White and its impact, Dean Richard
Briffault makes the following general point:
[Tihe Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the constitutional norms governing elections-such as the scope of suffrage,
the allocation of voting power, and the power to restrict campaign finance practices-may vary according to the subject... [to

be] put before the voters or the powers and responsibilities of the
office to be filled.36 °
Some of the examples he cites are not highly persuasive, notably
special districts, bond issues, and county government reorganization.3 6 1 Cases involving the judiciary3 62 and campaign finance3 63 are
closer to the mark.
One might break the issue down into two separate questions. The
first is whether a court, in evaluating an election regulation, can
look "down the road" at what happens after the election. One might
argue that the state cannot reach this stage of behavior through
regulation of an election and the campaign that precedes it. Perhaps
any such regulation should, at least presumptively, be limited to
securing the goals of "fair" voting and campaign practices. Thus, a
state could outlaw vote buying, for example, or campaigning within
the polling place itself.36 4 Such a concern seems to have motivated
the Eighth Circuit in the remand of White. An en banc majority
struck down Minnesota's partisan activities clause. 65 In a key
360. Briffault, supranote 2, at 192.
361. Id. at 188-90.
362. Id. at 191-92. Dean Briffault discusses the applicability to judicial elections of the "one
person, one vote" rule and the Voting Rights Act.
363. Id. at 190-91.
364. The current controversy over fraudulent voting can be seen as an example of such
regulation.
365. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). In
addition to the partisan activities clause, the decision also struck down the Minnesota Canon
prohibiting personal solicitation by judicial candidates. Id. The validity of both Canons had
been left unresolved by the Supreme Court decision.
Post- White debates over the interaction between the Canons and the nature of judicial
elections appear to focus on Canons dealing directly with speech-such as announce, pledges
or promises, and commitment clauses-and the regulation of fundraising activities. The
former are highly visible because of White; the latter are equally as visible because of the
controversial nature of judicial fundraising. Somewhat lost in the shuffle has been the issue
of nonpartisan elections. For an interesting recent discussion of the issue, see Russell S. Sobel
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passage, the majority stated: 'We note that Appellees fret over the
kind of influence political parties have in not only elections, but also
governmental decisions made thereafter. This case, however, is not
about what happens after an election."'66 Dean Briffault, however,
views Supreme Court doctrine as permitting a state to impose
regulations "in light of the government actions affected by the
election," and "the differences in the dangers posed by the regulated
behavior on the public offices ... determined by the election. 3 67
The classic example of government's ability to look down the road
is the treatment of campaign contribution limits in Buckley v.
Valeo. 36 Buckley is the foundation of modern campaign finance
doctrine, and despite attacks from different sides of the spectrum, 6 9
the case appears to retain its force. 3 ° The Court in Buckley upheld
a restriction on campaign contributions, even though there was
infringement on First Amendment rights 371 that required the
"closest scrutiny. '372 The core interest advanced in support of limits
was "the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial
contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected
to office. 373
The Court accepted this interest as constitutionally sufficient. It
conceded that precise empirical evidence might not be available,37 4
but held that "[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
& Joshua C. Hall, The Effect of JudicialSelection Processes on JudicialQuality: The Role of
PartisanPolitics, 27 CATO J. 69, 79 (2007) (concluding in part that "it is the partisan nature
of elections that causes judicial quality to decline, not simply the electoral process as has been
the commonly accepted wisdom from previous research").
366. White, 416 F.3d at 752 (emphasis added).
367. Briffault, supra note 2, at 188.
368. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
369. Liberals tend to attack Buckley for prohibiting limitations on campaign expenditures,
while conservatives tend to disagree with its approval of limits on contributions.
370. See generally Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006). Two members of the Court
invoked stare decisis in relying on Buckley. Others suggested that it might be reconsidered,
but the dominant theme of the opinion appears to be the application of the Buckley framework
to find the Vermont law in question unconstitutional. See discussion infra at note 422.
371. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-25. The Court identified both rights of speech and association
as at issue.
372. Id. at 25 (internal citation omitted).
373. Id. (emphasis added).
374. Id. at 27.
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holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined." '7 5 Thus, the Court upheld prophylactic legislation
aimed at a down-the-road evil. It is particularly important to note
that opponents of the contribution limits argued that government
should be limited to dealing with the evil when it occurs. They
invoked bribery laws and disclosure requirements as a less restrictive means of dealing with it.3 76 The invocation of bribery is a downthe-road argument. Government should deal with corruption when
it arises, not through limits on protected activity at the campaign
stage. The Court rejected the argument, however, and upheld
clearly prophylactic limits on campaign activity: the giving of
contributions. 7
This leads to a second question: assuming that down-the-road
analysis is appropriate in some contexts, is it appropriate in judicial
elections? Can the election-more precisely the campaign-affect
the functioning of an office? As Dean Briffault puts it, are there
"aspects of the judicial office that support greater regulation of
judicial elections than elections for the legislative and executive
branches"? 7 8 Certainly the network of Canon-based regulation is
aimed at preventing campaign behavior, such as statements,
political activities, or financial dealings with supporters, that could
affect, or appear to affect, the operation of the judiciary. It represents what Justice Ginsburg called "an election process geared to
the judicial office." '79
Courts and commentators have read the majority opinion in
White as casting serious doubt on any such approach when forced to
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.3 s Yet, Justice Scalia's
375. Id. at 26-27.
376. Id. at 27.
377. Id. at 27-28. Ironically, the Challengers can be viewed as engaging in down-the-road
analysis. "Anything goes" elections also will affect the functioning of the institution by leading
to law made "according to the values of the people." See Carter, supra note 212. Indeed, as I
have suggested, they may be taking down-the-road analysis a considerable, and dubious, step
further to the proposition that the conduct of the election affects the nature of the institution.
Untrammeled elections will help the judiciary take its rightful place as one of the political
branches, a majoritarian institution.
378. Briffault, supra note 2, at 198.
379. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 805 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
380. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d. 738, 746 (8th Cir. 2005) ('The
facts of this case demonstrate the extent to which these provisions chill, even kill, political
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discussion of party bias points the other way. He suggests that
preventing "speech for or against particular parties '' 38 1 constitutes
a compelling state interest. 3 2 There is certainly an intuitive appeal
to the notion that some campaign speech could threaten due
process.
If, for instance, the appeal of Jones's rape conviction is pending
during an election for the State Supreme Court, there would be
serious due process problems presented by a successful candidate's
statement that "if elected, I will vote to uphold the Jones conviction." The problem can take more complicated forms. In White,
Justice Stevens argued that one cannot always draw a sharp line
between bias against particular litigants and bias against a class of
litigants.8 3 What about even more difficult scenarios such as a
judicial candidate who promises to give special credibility to the
testimony of law enforcement officials? 384 It is worth noting that
some of White's strongest defenders appear to concede that there are
some things that judicial candidates may be prevented from
saying. 38 5 This Article's point is not to contend for the validity of any
particular Canon. Rather, it is to show that judicial elections
represent a strong case for the state's ability to take the down-theroad consequences into account in attempting to regulate activities
that can claim First Amendment protection. Indeed, they represent
the quintessential case.
If, then, one concludes that not all "political" offices are alike and
that all elections need not, for First Amendment purposes, be alike,
then White's foundations appear weakened and its status as a
precedential juggernaut diminished. While the First Amendment
applies, courts should be receptive to finding a compelling state
interest in broad protection of litigants' due process rights.3 86 The
speech and associational rights."). See generally Stern, supra note 88.
381. White, 536 U.S. at 776 (emphasis omitted).
382. Id. at 775-77.
383. Id. at 800-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Expressions that stress a candidate's unbroken
record of affirming convictions for rape, for example, imply a bias in favor of a particular
litigant (the prosecutor) and against a class of litigants (defendants in rape cases)." (footnote
omitted)).
384. See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 88 (Fla. 2003).
385. See, e.g., Dimino, supra note 3, at 380-82 (indicating approval of, for example,
prohibition on speech concerning pending cases).
386. See Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975-77 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (discussing
compelling state interest in open-mindedness).
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concept of avoiding the appearance of unfairness certainly deserves
more attention than it received in White. Beyond any general
interest in avoiding the appearance of corruption present in
campaign contribution cases38 7 lies the particular importance of
public perception of the judiciary as fair, unbiased, and not tainted
by prejudgment. 8 Conceivably, courts could require a less than
compelling interest-a First Amendment form of intermediate
scrutiny-as campaign finance cases have suggested. 3 9 The policy
arguments behind the presumption against politicization retain
their force, and are not trumped after all. This Article has emphasized arguments that appeal to conservatives, in part because, as
the lineup in White itself suggests, most liberals are already on
board in terms of preserving Canon-based regulation.3 9 ° An appeal
to conservatives also makes sense both because they are the driving
force behind the challenges and because an anti-regulatory stance
has inherent appeal to them. The goal of this Article is not a 180degree turn, but a recognition of the complexities of the problem and
a sympathy, however difficult, for some regulation. Wherever one
stands in the overall debate, it must be recognized that White is the
guiding precedent. It is the only Supreme Court decision on Canonbased regulation of judicial elections. 391 The arguments presented
above are not aimed at securing its overruling-a dubious objective
-but at slowing down its snowball effect in the lower courts, and at
influencing any future Supreme Court consideration of the issue.3 92
387. See Schotland, supra note 3, at 1086 (discussing issues of campaign financing and
whether the problem rises to the level of corruption).
388. Id. at 1079.
389. See generally Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
390. The four dissenting Justices-Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens-are
generally viewed as the Court's "liberal wing." I think that most observers would consider the
ABA a liberal organization within the framework advanced here. At least one notable liberal
academic, however, has expressed his approval of White. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15 ("I
have long believed that the Model Code's restrictions on speech by candidates for judicial
office are unconstitutional under basic First Amendment principles." (footnote omitted)).
391. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 182-83, 191-92 (discussing Supreme Court decisions on
voting rights in judicial elections).
392. Given the volume of post- White litigation percolating in the lower courts, it is highly
likely that the matter will return to the Supreme Court. See Jefferson County Racing Ass'n,
Inc. v. Barber, 127 S. Ct. 2975 (2007) (denying certiorari in case requesting recusal when
judges had made statements as candidates on the general issues presented); Barber v.
Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, 960 So. 2d 599, 619 (Ala. 2006) (Bolin, J., statement of
nonrecusal).
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In the meantime, life goes on. Judicial elections will continue to be
held, particularly because a shift away from them seems highly
unlikely.39 3 This Article concludes with a brief examination of what
they might look like in the post- White world.
IV. THE POST- WHITE WORLD

One can envisage three possible scenarios: a return to the prior
system of Canon-based regulation; an end to regulation of judicial
campaigns other than that applicable to political branch offices; or
a second generation of rules and practices including (perhaps) some
coercive measures, voluntary limits on campaign practices, and new
forms of state involvement in judicial elections such as public
financing. The first scenario can be quickly ruled out. White is not
going away; the current Court is virtually certain not to overrule it.
The question for judges and policymakers is how much regulation,
if any, is permissible under White, and where to go beyond regulation.
The second scenario-what the White dissenters referred to as
"political elections, ' 394 or "anything goes," ' 9 -is a distinct possibility. In an excellent recent analysis, Professor Stern contends:
[E]fforts to preserve potent constraints on judicial campaign
speech are overwhelmingly doomed to failure. Whatever the
merits of restrictions in the abstract, White has nullified their
underlying premise: viz., that a state, having chosen to select
judges through elections, can substantially modify the ordinary
operation of principles governing political speech. Rather, White
embodies rejection of the notion that states can insulate judicial
campaign speech from these principles.396

393. See Stern, supra note 88, at 68 (noting that "[a] poll conducted in 2001 found that
voters in states with elected judges overwhelmingly preferred election to appointment; the
resounding defeat of proposals in Ohio and Florida to switch from elective to appointive
systems appear to confirm this attitude" (footnotes omitted)).
394. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 806 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
395. Id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
396. Stern, supra note 88, at 64.
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He sees White as a decision of great precedential force, emphasizing
the following aspects: the denial of "judicial exceptionalism; ''39 7 the
notion that judicial elections should be different from other
elections; the difficulty that strict scrutiny review poses for any
3 9 9 -a case with
regulation; 398 the majority's use of Brown v. Hartlage
a strong thrust against regulation of campaign speech generally;
and the White majority's apparent reluctance to credit the state's
assertion of interests in regulating judicial campaign speech."'
Professor Stern also places considerable emphasis on "lower courts'
receptiveness to attacks on other judicial campaign speech restrictions ' ' after White's invalidation of the Announce Clause.4 2
For Professor Stern, the post- White world is not necessarily a bad
place. He views as important the availability of recusal4 °3 as a
possible less restrictive alternative and thus "a means to avoid
impinging on speech and conduct ordinarily protected by the First
Amendment."4 4 He also notes the classic First Amendment argument, invoked by Justice Kennedy in White, 0 5 that the remedy for
irresponsible speech is "open debate and voters' reactions." 4 6 This
397. Id. at 81.
398. Id. at 87-95.
399. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
400. Stern, supra note 88, at 89-91.
401. Id. at 78.
402. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1232-34 (11th Cir. 2006);
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738,751-53,759-60,766 (8th Cir. 2005); Weaver
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1318-24 (11th Cir. 2002); Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F.
Supp. 2d 879, 882-83 (N.D. Ind. 2006); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021,
1035-37 (D.N.D. 2005); Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 130 S.W.3d
524, 535-38 (Ark. 2003).
403. Stern, supra note 88, at 91-92 ("Instead, a judge whose statement betrayed implacable
bias could be replaced by an openminded judge as an alternative less restrictive of speech."
(footnote omitted)).
404. Id. at 127. 1 am less confident about the utility of recusal as a means of answering the
objections of those who must appear before judges who have already expressed opinions
contrary to those the future litigants must advance. One of the unfortunate byproducts of this
approach is the inevitable development of a substantial body of constitutionally based federal
"recusal law" for state courts. Cf. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Barber, 127 S. Ct.
2975 (2007) (denying certiorari in case requesting recusal when judges had as candidates
made statements on the general issues presented); Barber v. Jefferson County Racing Ass'n,
960 So. 2d 599, 619 (Ala. 2006) (Bolin, J., statement of nonrecusal).
405. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. at 765, 792, 794-95 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Stern, supra note 88, at 135.
406. Stern, supra note 88, at 121.
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argument has become a cornerstone of conservative attacks on the
Canons' restriction of judicial campaign speech. Professor Dimino,
for example, draws on Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
4 7 to argue
Whitney v. California
that "the proper corrective for
speech promoting improper ideas is 'more speech' promoting the
proper ideas."4 0 8
Although Professor Stern predicts the fall of the Canons, he is not
necessarily predicting the arrival of "anything goes." He notes that
"proponents of reform have advanced other means to curb the
excesses of judicial campaigning and promote the election of worthy
judges."4 °9 These "other means" are essentially nonregulatory, in
keeping with the dictates of White. This Article will discuss them,
in the context of the third scenario. At this point, it is important to
note that the possibility of self-correction, within the White parameters, is an initial justification for the Challengers' position. Justice
at Stake's 2006 Report states that "the message" from voters is that
"if you want to campaign like a politician, maybe you should run for
the legislature. At least in the short term, American voters seem to
be sending a strong message to would-be judges: tell us why you
would be a good judge, not about your personal political views."4 1
This "message," however, raises a number of questions. After all, we
are only at the beginning of the post-White world. Is this, presumably salutary, phenomenon short-term only? How can contentious,
perhaps prejudicial, issues be kept out of judicial campaigns? What
about the problem of campaign finance, particularly direct solicitation from lawyers and potential litigants? Does not self-correction
ultimately require a degree of regulation to make it stick?
This brings us to the third scenario for post-White (and postCanon) "regulation" of judicial campaigns. It is distinctly possible
that a component of this new generation will be true regulation.
Some of the existing Canons, or something like them, may survive
White. Scholars have differed sharply on the question. Dean
Briffault has suggested that Canons such as those dealing with
407. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Dimino, supra note 3, at
304 n.20.
408. Dimino, supra note 3, at 304.
409. Stern, supra note 88, at 132.
410. See JAS REPORT 2006, supra note 3, at 38.
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pledges or promises, misrepresentations, personal solicitation of
contributions, and partisan political activity will survive.4 11 As
noted, Professor Stern doubts any will survive.4 12 Much depends,
obviously, on whether one accepts the arguments advanced here for
a narrow reading of White.
This Article does not discuss specific Canons. Its goal is to analyze
and influence the conservative position on the general question of
regulation of judicial campaigns. It is important to note, however,
that the pro-regulation case is stronger in some areas than others.
Given the nature of the judicial office, the solicitation of campaign
funds seems particularly problematic and potentially susceptible
to regulation. The spectacle of judges/candidates raising money
from litigants/lawyers who then appear before them raises troubling
questions about due process for opposing parties as well as the
general fairness of state courts. As Dean Briffault states, "[Plersonal
solicitation highlights the dangers of abuse by focusing on the
potentially coercive nature of the request for contributions aimed at
a potential donor who has or is likely to have business before the
'
judge seeking the contribution."4 13
In making this point, Dean Briffault invokes the campaign
finance cases and their emphasis on preventing corruption or its
appearance.4 14 Although a majority of the Eighth Circuit rejected
the applicability of anti-corruption rationales to judicial elections,4 1
this seems too hasty a conclusion. Granted, there is debate within
the Supreme Court over the breadth of the concept of corruption.41 6
One could extrapolate from some cases a broad view of corruption
as unfaithfulness to the obligation of office,41 ' to conclude that any
incurring of political debts-such as partisan obligations-is a
"corruption" of the judicial office.4" 8 Even if one limits corruption to

411. See generally Briffault, supra note 2.
412. See generally Stern, supra note 88.
413. Briffault, supra note 2, at 225.
414. Id. ("The Supreme Court, in cases from Buckley through McConnell, has repeatedly
").
held that campaign contributions raise the dangers of corruption ....
415. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 756 n.8 (8th Cir. 2005).
416. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 290 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-89 (2000).
417. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 241 (majority opinion).
418. White, 416 F.3d at 769-70 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof,4 19 however, the
area of judicial campaign financing invites regulation. In invoking
Buckley, I recognize that many conservatives oppose its proregulatory aspects, particularly if read broadly.4 2 ° Buckley not only
remains intact, however; it is also the reference point for most
Supreme Court analysis of campaign finance reform legislation.4 2 '
Reports of its demise4 22 are greatly exaggerated.
The third scenario might also encompass a number of nonregulatory measures. A report to the Chief Judge of the State of
New York from the Commission to Promote Public Confidence in
Judicial Elections42 3 listed such possibilities as "independent
commissions to evaluate the qualifications of judicial candidates
throughout the State";42 4 "the creation of a campaign ethics and
conduct center; the expansion of judicial campaign finance disclosure; and the establishment of a State-sponsored judicial election

419. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 292-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 357 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 297-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Shrink, 528 U.S.
at 422-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
421. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
422. See James Coleman, The Slow, Just, Unfinished Demise of the Buckley Compromise:
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2470 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 427, 437 (2006) ("[The
Court's fractured opinions in Randall show that the Buckley compromise is falling apart ....
").
It should be noted, however, that Shrink, decided in 2000, was also described as possibly the
beginning of the end of Buckley. See generally Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729
(2001). The Court's two most recent campaign finance decisions have an anti-regulatory
thrust. Randall, decided two terms ago, struck down a Vermont regulatory scheme. During
the last term, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672-74 (2007), struck
down a key section of the Bi-Partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as applied to "issue
advocacy" by a corporation. Both the plurality and concurring opinions emphasized the
importance of speech in the political context. Id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring), 2675, 2678
(Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, one might argue that a conservative majority is choosing to
focus on the anti-regulatory side of Buckley. At the same time, however, the Court appeared
to accept Buckley's anti-corruption rationale at least if the concept of corruption emphasizes
political quid pro quos. See id. at 2672-73 (majority opinion). Thus, I am inclined to view
Buckley as alive and well. I recognize the theoretical possibility of acceptance of the argument
that any form of third-party political expenditure, including contributions, enhances political
dialogue. Thus, Buckley's emphasis on the need for a quid pro quo could come to be limited
to express agreements of the bribery sort. This was the position rejected in Buckley, and I do
not see the current Court as moving toward it.
423. See N.Y. REPORT 2006, supra note 80.
424. Id. at 10.
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voter guide. 4 25 Professor Stern cites the possibility of "conversion of
mandatory restraints on speech to guidelines that candidates are
426
urged to follow.
Perhaps most interesting is the sharp increase in focus on public
financing of judicial campaigns in the post-White world. 427 As of this
writing, bills for public financing of supreme court races have been
introduced in several states.42 8 North Carolina's existing system of
public finance has survived an initial judicial challenge, brought by
40
a conservative group. 429 New Mexico has recently adopted it. 1
There is a good deal of irony in the prospect of successful challenges
to the Canons, mounted by conservatives, leading to widespread
adoption of public financing of judicial campaigns. Opposition to
public financing has long been a core aspect of conservative views
on campaign finance reform.43 ' Indeed, conservatives may feel that
the pressures to run as a "clean judicial elections" candidate, to
adhere to "voluntary" restraints, or to respect the rulings of
campaign conduct committees represent the kind of coercion
associated with the regulatory regimes that they thought White had
eliminated. Once again, the "victory" has unintended consequences.
The notion that judicial elections are different and should be
subject to a different set of rules from those governing elections to
the political branches is one that will not go away. At the same time,
White is on the books, and, along with its progeny, is the guiding
precedent in the area. Many conservatives regard the decision as a

425. Id. at 11.
426. Stern, supranote 88, at 132 (citation omitted).
427. Id. at 133-34 ("Public financing of judicial elections, notably undertaken by North
Carolina in the wake of White, has been advanced by many as a means of curbing the
influence of campaign contributors." (citations omitted)).
428. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Seven States Look at Public Financingfor JudicialRaces,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1.
429. See generally Jackson v. Leek, No. 1:056CV00691, 2006 WL 2264027 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
7, 2006).
430. See Deborah Baker, Governor Signs Bill Passed in Special Legislative Session, AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'y, Apr. 14, 2007, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/news/detail.
cfm?statenewsid=115.
431. See BRAD SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 88-105
(2001) (noting problems with public financing of political campaigns). Professor Dimino,
however, has expressed approval of public financing for judicial campaigns. See Michael
Dimino, Op-Ed., Appoint? Objection!, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 4, 2007.
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great victory.43 This Article's goal is to persuade conservatives to at
least slow down their assault on the Canons, and take a sober
second look. I recognize that we are in the post-White world. Thus,
some version of scenarios two or three is where the system is
headed.4 3 3 The Challengers are likely to be suspicious of the third
scenario, particularly to the extent they view it as an attempt to reintroduce the pre- White world-the first scenario-by the back door.
If one accepts the arguments-both policy and legal-offered
here, conservatives ought to favor a strong version of the third
scenario: one that contains some traditional regulation as well as
newer approaches. This Article has argued that as a matter of law,
White need not be read broadly. This conclusion is based not so
much on a hopeful reading of the majority's disclaimer,4 34 as on my
view of the weakness of its premises. Much hinges on how one
assesses the results of politicization. The Challengers appear to
view it as an unmixed good: one that furthers the values of the First
Amendment while advancing conservative goals. But if the state
courts are weakened in their ability to do justice in parity with the
federal courts and are so perceived, core conservative values are
threatened. The threat to due process that flows from politicization
is a threat to judicial federalism-a fundamental building block of
our constitutional system. One might even view politicization and
its consequences as a step towards the ultimate demise of the
elected judiciary.4 3 5 Right now the Challengers are winning. At some
432. See Press Release, James Madison Ctr., U.S. Supreme Court Denies Review of
Decision Striking Down Bans on Judicial Candidates' Political Activities and Campaign
Funds Solicitation (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.jamesmadisoncenter.orgITest/content.html
(scroll to bottom of posted press releases) (describing denial of certiorari from White decision
on remand as a "major victory").
433. Implicit in this statement is that the second scenario will not exist in its pure form.
I have already ruled out the first scenario.
434. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002) ("[W]e neither assert nor
imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as
those for legislative office."); see Stern, supra note 88, at 75 ("Much other commentary as well
has been marked by varying degrees of optimism that White left other significant restraints
intact." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 75 n.96 (listing legal commentary on White).
435. See Editorial, supra note 338 ("If the courts are going to pursue justice rather than
advance special-interest agendas, states must either adopt public financing and strict fund
raising rules for judicial elections or switch to a nonelective merit selection system."); see also
Emilie Lounsberry, ForumAsks: Does Money Sway Judges?,PHILA. INQUIRER, May 31, 2007,
at Bi (quoting Pennsylvania's Governor Ed Rendell as being in favor of changing from an
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point those who are inclined to sympathize with them may well be
reminded of two venerable maxims: "be careful what you wish for,"
and "another such victory and I am undone."
CONCLUSION

The American judiciary is undergoing a fundamental transformation, at least in the thirty-nine states that use elections as some part
of their judicial selection process. That process is becoming more
politicized, more like the rough-and-tumble electoral process for
legislative and executive offices. This dramatic change is the result
of a breakdown in the existing system of campaign regulation based
on the ABA Canons. The state regulations are an attempt to hold
the system in a form of equipoise-permitting the election of judges,
but limiting campaign conduct that harms the judiciary once
successful candidates are on the bench. Their breakdown is fueled
by the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, which struck down a state regulation that was modeled on
the Canons. White is but one of a number of successful challenges to
Canon-based regulation. Many conservatives think this development is a great victory. Indeed, conservatives are the driving force
behind the challenges.
This Article has argued that conservatives should oppose
politicization of the state judiciaries. It calls into question important
tenets about federalism and the role of states in achieving the rule
of law. For example, judicial federalism rests on fundamental
assumptions about the American constitutional order, and the
central role of state courts in that order. The widespread acceptance
of this vision is a victory for conservative principles. One would
hardly expect conservatives to support a transformation of the state
judiciaries that undermines that order. As a policy matter, White
need not beread as requiring wholesale invalidation of Canon-based
elected system to an appointed one); JAS REPORT 2006, supranote 3, at viii (noting increased
interest in merit selection in Minnesota); Mark H. Alcott, Judicial Selection: Time for True
Reform, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 2007, at 13 ("rrue reform of the system requires nothing less than
a constitutional amendment implementing a merit selection process for judges."); Alabama:
Judge Writes in Favor of Missouri Plan, Posting of Ed to Votelaw.com, http://www.
votelaw.com/bloglarchives/004773.html (Nov. 20, 2006, 08:01 EST) (noting calls by members
of the Alabama Supreme Court for a new method of judicial selection).
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regulation. The system need not descend into "anything goes." That
hardly seems a victory worth seeking.

